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PRE-COMPETITION*
JORGE L. CONTRERAS** & LIZA S. VERTINSKY***
As the costs of pharmaceutical research and development rise
and concerns grow about the pace of innovation, both federal
agencies and industry participants have turned to new forms of
collaboration to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
biomedical research. Industry participants, many of them
competitors, come together to define joint research and
development objectives and to share project results in what are
widely known as “pre-competitive” collaborations. There is a
prevailing understanding among both industry and governmental
actors that these pre-competitive endeavors are not only
permissible, but encouraged.
While the term “pre-competitive” is prevalent in the
pharmaceutical industry, it is missing from the antitrust lexicon.
Neither the courts nor the federal agencies charged with
enforcing U.S. antitrust laws have ever recognized precompetitive activity as immune from antitrust challenge. Rather,
antitrust regulators have repeatedly emphasized that when
competitors collaborate, anticompetitive behavior may arise
regardless of the stage at which collaborating occurs.
This Article critically examines the phenomenon of precompetitive collaboration through an antitrust lens. It analyzes
the apparent disconnect between the industry reliance on precompetition as a way of demarcating procompetitive
arrangements among competitors, on the one hand, and the
absence of any such distinction in antitrust law or practice, on the
other. It then explores the ways that this disconnect may manifest
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itself in the choice and structure of collaborative arrangements
and suggests a framework for refocusing attention on
collaborations that are procompetitive, irrespective of the stage of
development.
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INTRODUCTION
Pre-competitive collaboration has become all the rage in some of
today’s most competitive markets. Industries in which such collective
activity has gained traction include semiconductors,1 advanced
materials,2 nanotechnology,3 manufacturing,4 software,5 automotive,6
and biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (“biopharma”).7 One recent
survey commissioned by the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) identified
fifty significant pre-competitive collaborations in the biopharma
industry alone,8 and the topic of pre-competitive collaboration has
1. See, e.g., Elias G. Carayannis & Jeffrey Alexander, Strategy, Structure, and
Performance Issues of Precompetitive R&D Consortia: Insights and Lessons Learned from
SEMATECH, 51 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 226, 226 (2004).
2. See, e.g., STEERING COMM. FOR NASA TECH. ROADMAPS & NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., NASA SPACE TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPS AND
PRIORITIES: RESTORING NASA’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE AND PAVING THE WAY FOR
A NEW ERA IN SPACE 82 (2012) (noting that NASA’s goals include making “appropriate
efforts to develop pre-competitive technology relevant to the needs of the commercial
space sector”).
3. See, e.g., NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. & SUBCOMM. ON
NANOSCALE SCI., ENG’G, AND TECH., NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE
STRATEGIC PLAN 11 (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp
/nni_strategic_plan_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCU4-TLV8] (“Nanotechnology’s enormous
potential to address global challenges relating to water, health, and energy renders it an
ideal subject for collaboration on pre-competitive and non-competitive research.”); see
also Theodore H. Wegner & Philip E. Jones, Advancing Cellulose-Based Nanotechnology,
13 CELLULOSE 115, 116 (2006) (discussing the need for identifying pre-competitive
technological needs as part of innovation strategy).
4. See, e.g., Gregory L. Smith & James C. Muller, PreAmp—A Pre-competitive
Project in Intelligent Manufacturing Technology: An Architecture to Demonstrate
Concurrent Engineering and Information Sharing, 2 CONCURRENT ENGINEERING 107,
107 (1994) (describing pre-competitive R&D in the area of design and manufacturing of
printed circuit assemblies).
5. STEPHEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 21 (2004) (characterizing precompetitive collaboration in the software industry as “[c]ompetitors shar[ing] early stages
of research that benefit all”).
6. See Sean Elkins et al., Four Disruptive Strategies for Removing Drug Discovery
Bottlenecks, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 265, 268 (2013).
7. See infra Part I.
8. Jill S. Altschuler et al., Opening Up to Precompetitive Collaboration, 2 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1 (2010).

95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016)

70

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

been the focus of at least two major IOM studies in the last five
years.9
In this context, the term “pre-competitive” connotes early-stage
research and development (“R&D”) that is directed to non-product
specific research tools or data with the goal of benefitting the entire
industry rather than a single firm.10 In theory, pre-competitive
collaboration enables competitors to pool resources, know-how, and
intellectual property to advance the emergence of cutting edge
technologies, collect and disseminate data, develop common research
platforms and standards, and tackle other problems that are common
across an industry.11
These perceived benefits have attracted the interest of U.S.
governmental agencies, and many pre-competitive collaborations
have been encouraged by the agencies that regulate or otherwise
oversee the industries in which they are formed. The first prominent
pre-competitive research consortia were formed in the 1980s in the
U.S. computer industry to support a government-backed strategy for
meeting global competition.12 Around the same time, the Department
of Defense played an integral role in forming Sematech, a
semiconductor industry consortium organized to enhance the

9. For copies of both of these studies, see generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., EXTENDING THE SPECTRUM OF PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATION IN
ONCOLOGY RESEARCH (2010) [hereinafter IOM 2010 REPORT]; INST. OF MED. OF THE
NAT’L ACADS., ESTABLISHING PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS TO STIMULATE
GENOMICS-DRIVEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT (2011) [hereinafter IOM 2011 REPORT].
10. See IOM 2010 REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (defining pre-competitive collaboration
as “basic and preclinical research on drug targets and the early stages of clinical testing”);
Liza S. Vertinsky, Patents, Partnerships, and the Pre-Competition Collaboration Myth in
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1509, 1516 (2015) (defining precompetitive collaboration as “early stage research where the knowledge, results, and
materials that are shared do not—at least purportedly—confer a competitive advantage by
being shared”).
11. See Altschuler et al., supra note 8, at 1. Analogies can be drawn to industry-wide
collaborations in the design and adoption of technical interoperability standards such as
Wi-Fi, USB, and LTE in which competitors work together to establish common protocols
that enable different vendors’ products to interoperate in a seamless manner. See generally
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY (1999) (discussing the role cooperation and compatibility play in a
network economy).
12. See, e.g., NORMAN S. ZIMBEL, COOPERATION MEETS COMPETITION: THE
IMPACT OF CONSORTIA FOR PRECOMPETITIVE R&D IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY,
1982–92, at v (1992), http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/zimbel/zimbel-p92-10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T66X-DWBX] (discussing the study of the evolution of U.S. pre-competitive
research consortia for high-performance computing in the 1980s and 90s).
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competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor industry.13 Since then, a
range of governmental agencies including the National Institutes of
Health (“NIH”), Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), National
Science Foundation (“NSF”), and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (“NASA”) have facilitated the formation of precompetitive consortia and collaborations seeking to advance R&D in
the domains that they oversee.14 While many of these efforts have
focused on basic science and discovery, there has been an increasing
emphasis on activities more closely connected with product
development. Pressure to move collaborations downstream into areas
closer to commercial development has come from both government
actors eager to show concrete economic results from public R&D
investments and from private firms concerned about filling their
product pipelines while controlling cost and risk.15
This focus on pre-competitive, product-directed R&D has been
particularly pronounced in the biopharma industry, in which
productivity challenges are increasingly pushing competitors into
collaboration. Joint activity among competitors in this industry is not
only tolerated, but encouraged, by governmental agencies that
oversee the industry, so long as it occurs in areas deemed to be precompetitive.16 The theory, presumably, is that such collective activities
benefit the entire industry rather than an individual firm and must
therefore avoid antitrust concerns. Consequently, as comfort with
pre-competitive collaborations has grown in the biopharma industry,
both governmental agencies and private firms increasingly operate as
if an antitrust “safe harbor” exists for pre-competitive collaboration.17
13. See generally Douglas A. Irwin & Peter J. Klenow, Sematech: Purpose and
Performance, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,739 (1996) (noting how the U.S. government
financially backed the semiconductor industry leading to the formation of Sematech).
14. With respect to the NIH and FDA, see infra Part I. NASA has employed precompetitive collaborations as part of its aeronautics program. See, e.g., LISA PORTER,
NASA’S NEW AERONAUTICS RESEARCH PROGRAM 5 (2007), http://www.hq.nasa.gov
/office/aero/pdf/armd_overview_reno_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JC-532Y]. NSF has supported
pre-competitive R&D strategies through programs such as the Industry/University
Cooperative Research Centers program. See Industry/University Cooperative Research
Centers Program (I/UCRC), NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/funding
/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=5501 [https://perma.cc/V3HF-HFLB].
15. See Editorial, Expanding Precompetitive Space, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 883, 883 (2011); see also Altschuler et al., supra note 8, at 1 (citing increasing
numbers of collaborations “at the product-development end of the R&D value chain”).
16. See discussion and examples infra Section I.A.
17. Though not addressed in any detail, some groups in the biopharma industry have
begun to acknowledge a need for antitrust review of certain collaborations among
competitors. See, e.g., IOM 2010 REPORT, supra note 9, at 33 (“Concerns over privacy,
conflict of interest, antitrust law, and the sharing of international data can inhibit pre-
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Despite the frequent invocation of the term “pre-competitive” by
firms and agencies in the biopharma sector, the term has little, if any,
purchase in the literature or doctrine of antitrust law. In fact, as far as
determinable, no U.S. antitrust statute, regulation, agency guidance,
consent decree, or judicial decision has ever recognized or even
sought to define “pre-competition” or “pre-competitive” activity.
More importantly, neither the courts nor federal antitrust agencies
have designated pre-competitive activity as immune from antitrust
challenge.18 In fact, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) have expressly identified the potential
for anticompetitive R&D arrangements in markets before the
emergence of defined products (so-called “innovation markets” or
“R&D markets”).19
competitive collaborations.”); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SHARING CLINICAL
TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISK 190 (2015) (describing antitrust
issues addressed by author Jorge Contreras at IOM panel discussion of clinical trials data
sharing).
18. The National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301–06 (2012), permits firms that wish to engage in joint research or production to
make a public notification listing their names and the scope of their joint activity,
whereupon they are granted immunity from certain antitrust remedies, including treble
damages under the Sherman Act. See infra Part II.B.1.
19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10–11 (1995) [hereinafter IP LICENSING
GUIDELINES]. As part of their analysis of relevant markets within which to assess
competition, the DOJ and FTC refer in the IP Licensing Guidelines to three kinds of
markets: product markets, technology markets, and innovation markets. Id. at 8, 10. A
proposed update to the IP Licensing Guidelines was released by the FTC and DOJ for
public comment on August 12, 2016. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROPOSED
UPDATE—REDLINE (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/antitrustguidelines-licensing-intellectual-property-proposed-update-1995-guidelines-issued-us
/ip_guidelines_published_proposed_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX66-R6LG] [hereinafter
IP LICENSING GUIDELINES PROPOSED UPDATE]. The IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed
Update replace the term “innovation markets” with “research and development
market[s].” Id. at 15–17. This change is not intended to be substantive, but rather a
clarification of how these markets have actually been defined in enforcement actions. See,
e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and DOJ Seek View on Proposed Update of
the Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/08/ftc-doj-seek-views-proposed-update
-antitrust-guidelines-licensing [https://perma.cc/F4RV-CTR8]. The Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors issued by the FTC and the DOJ in April 2000 still refer
to “innovation markets” through reference to the IP Licensing Guidelines. FED. TRADE
COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS, § 3.32(c), at 17 (2000) [hereinafter COLLABORATION
GUIDELINES]. Section 3.32(c), Research and Development: Innovation Markets, refers to
section 3.2.3 of the IP Licensing Guidelines. Id. In this Article we use the terminology of
the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update, referring to “research and development
markets” rather than “innovation markets.” See Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory
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This Article critically examines the phenomenon of precompetitive collaboration through an antitrust lens.20 The authors
observe that while many pre-competitive collaborations may indeed
offer procompetitive benefits and thereby avoid antitrust concern, it
is not the case that every collaboration conducted prior to product
release or as part of a common technology platform will be immune
from antitrust condemnation. Accordingly, the tendency to focus on
pre-competitive collaborations as inherently procompetitive and
deserving of some form of antitrust safe harbor is misguided. And far
from being benign, this misconception has the potential both to
encourage early-stage collaborations that may in fact be
anticompetitive, and to discourage later-stage, yet manifestly
procompetitive, collaborations. This Article focuses on the biopharma
industry because of the prominent role that pre-competitive
collaboration has taken in the policy debate over the spiraling costs of
drug development and the enthusiasm with which the NIH, the FDA,
and private firms have embraced the pre-competitive model.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a detailed
analysis of pre-competitive collaboration in the biopharma sector.
This Part addresses the market pressures that have led competitors to
collaborate, as well as the policy goals of agencies in actively
promoting such collaborations. It then offers three case studies
illustrating the objectives, organizational structure, and collaborative
activity of biopharma pre-competitive collaborations at different
stages along the product commercialization path: (1) the SNP
Consortium, an early-stage basic science collaboration that worked
alongside the Human Genome Project to release DNA marker data
to the public; (2) the international Serious Adverse Events
Consortium, a jointly-funded industry effort to identify genetic
markers for adverse reactions to existing therapeutics; and (3) the
Accelerating Medicines Partnership, a collaboration among
pharmaceutical firms to identify drug targets for four identified
disease categories.
Part II outlines the legal framework established by the U.S.
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies to analyze horizontal
arrangements among competitors, particularly those involving the
licensing of intellectual property and the conduct of R&D. It looks
and Case Studies, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 471, 471 (using the terminology of
“innovation markets” as well).
20. While previous authors have analyzed the antitrust implications of specific
industry collaborations, their focus has not been on the general practice of pre-competitive
collaboration. See, e.g., Irwin & Klenow, supra note 13, at 12,740–41.
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specifically at the agencies’ analyses of R&D markets,21 much of
which has occurred in the context of merger transactions within the
pharmaceutical industry. Part II examines the factors that these
agencies weighed to determine whether an R&D collaboration may
be considered procompetitive or anticompetitive.
Part III applies this established antitrust framework to precompetitive collaborations at different stages along the product
development cycle. It uses hypothetical examples to illustrate the
disconnect between current industry understandings and uses of precompetitive collaborations and the actual analysis conducted by
courts and agencies to determine whether R&D collaborations
among competitors are procompetitive or anticompetitive. This Part
goes on to identify measures that may reduce antitrust concerns in
such collaborations.
The Article concludes by urging both industry participants and
governmental agencies to evaluate more closely the potential
procompetitive and anticompetitive features of any proposed industry
collaboration, and not simply to rely on a conclusory characterization
of such activities as pre-competitive or to presumptively favor precompetitive collaborations over collaborations at later stages of
product or market development.
I. PRE-COMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS AS INNOVATION
STRATEGIES
Rising costs, shrinking budgets, massive risks of failure at even
late stages of drug development, and the complexity of those diseases
that are still in need of treatments are forcing pharmaceutical firms to
search for new approaches to drug discovery and development.22 In
the past, pharmaceutical companies have worked largely in silos,

21. This Article relies on the IP Licensing Guidelines as a description of the analytical
framework that the FTC and DOJ apply in the context of arrangements involving
intellectual property licenses. As discussed in note 19, supra, a draft update to these
guidelines, the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update, has been released for comment.
While the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update were, at the time this Article went to
press, still in draft form and may change, this Article adopts their updated terminology
and refers to R&D markets in place of innovation markets.
22. For a discussion of the challenges facing traditional models of pharmaceutical
development and the need for change, see Mark Kessel, The Problem with Today’s
Pharmaceutical Business—an Outsider’s View, 29 NATURE BIOTECH. 27, 27–28, 30 (2011);
see also Janet Woodcock, Precompetitive Research: A New Prescription for Drug
Development?, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 521, 522–23 (2010).
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pursuing closed, highly secretive drug discovery and development.23
But the traditional fully integrated business models that large
pharmaceutical firms have relied upon for decades are no longer
either efficient or sustainable.24 The decline in the productivity of
pharmaceutical R&D is well documented.25 The number of new FDA
approved drugs per billion dollars of R&D spending roughly halved
every nine years between 1950 and 2010.26 Although the total number
of new drug approvals by the FDA has increased since 2010, many of
the new drug approvals are for orphan drugs that have huge price
tags, significant tax incentives and regulatory support, and very small
patient populations.27 Meanwhile, private sector investments in
disease areas with the largest public health burdens in the United
States, such as certain types of cancer, diabetes, and Alzheimer’s
disease, remain stagnant at best, and the results of development
efforts remain disappointing.28 Both public sector actors, such as the
23. See, e.g., Barbara Mittleman, Garry Neil & Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld,
Precompetitive Consortia in Biomedicine—How Are We Doing?, 31 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 979, 980 (2013).
24. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: CHALLENGING
BUSINESS MODELS 1–4 (2009).
25. See, e.g., Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 959, 959 (2009) (presenting corporate perspective on
the problem, suggesting that lack of growth in drug-output ratio may reflect limits of
current R&D model); Fabio Pammolli, Laura Magazzini & Massimo Riccaboni, The
Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428,
428 (2011) (examining the decline in pharmaceutical R&D productivity using a large
database of R&D projects); Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in
Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 191–92
(2012) (surveying literature examining the decline in pharmaceutical R&D productivity).
But see Iain M. Cockburn, Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis?, in 7
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1–4 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2007)
(acknowledging the problem of the rising cost per new drug, but suggesting that trends of
decline are exaggerated).
26. See, e.g., Scannell et al., supra note 25, at 191 (suggesting that the pharmaceutical
industry is following “Eroom’s Law” (Moore spelled backwards), when it comes to
productivity growth).
27. For a summary of new drug approvals over the past decade, see U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, NOVEL NEW DRUGS
2014 SUMMARY 1–3 (2015). For a discussion of the shift towards niche market strategies
focusing on orphan diseases, see Ashish Kumar Kakkar & Neha Dahiya, The Evolving
Drug Development Landscape: From Blockbusters to Niche Busters in the Orphan Drug
Space, 75 DRUG DEV. RES. 231, 231 (2014). See also Elie Dolgin, Big Pharma Moves from
‘Blockbusters’ to ‘Niche Busters’, 16 NATURE MED. 837, 837 (2010). For a discussion of the
high pricing of orphan drugs, see John-Paul Michaud, Robin Modi & M. Ian Phillips, Is
Orphan Drug Pricing Blowing a Bubble? The Unique Situation of Orphan Drugs and Why
High Prices Will Likely Persist, 1 EXPERT OPINION ON ORPHAN DRUGS 675, 675 (2013).
28. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN
DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVALUATION, at vi–ix (2012); SOEREN
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NIH and publicly funded institutions such as universities and
academic medical centers, are facing their own fiscal woes, limiting
their ability to contribute to costly R&D ventures.29 The decline in
productivity, along with the growing disconnect between the size of
investment flows and the magnitude of unmet medical needs, have
been of immense concern to the NIH, the FDA, and other public
sector stakeholders.30
The challenges facing the U.S. biopharma industry come at a
time when breakthroughs in science and technology should be leading
to rapid progress in drug discovery and development.31 There have
been major scientific advances in our understanding of the nature and
causes of different diseases, in some cases leading to entirely new
disease classifications and strategies for interventions.32 Tools for
biomedical research have become increasingly powerful, enabling
advances including the sequencing of the human genome, the
mapping of individual genetic variations, the study of genes in new
animal models, and the ability to monitor and study proteins and
measure cellular responses.33 Translating these breakthroughs into a
new generation of medical therapies has, however, been frustratingly
slow.34
MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., THE NEW NEGLECTED DISEASES? 4 (2013), http://www
.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE117/RAND_PE117.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A9BY-WNGB] (explaining why pharmaceutical companies invest less money in
developing drugs for common diseases such as Alzheimer’s).
29. See, e.g., Richard Harris & Robert Benincasa, U.S. Science Suffering from Booms
and Busts in Funding, NPR (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2014/09/09/340716091/u-s-science-suffering-from-booms-and-busts-in-funding [https://
perma.cc/EVM4-VFXA]; Melissa Korn, Once Cash Cows, University Hospitals Now
Source of Worry for Schools, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/universities-get-second-opinion-on-their-hospitals-1429725107.
30. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, A Dearth in Innovation for Key Drugs, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/business/a-dearth-of-investment-inmuch-needed-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/G5ZD-6URD] (suggesting that firms are
flocking to rare diseases because development is cheaper and profits are higher, leaving
behind some of the disease areas with the biggest public health costs); see also
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 28, at vii–viii.
31. See, e.g., Sally Rockey & Francis Collins, One Nation in Support of Biomedical
Research?, NIH DIRECTOR’S BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), https://directorsblog.nih.gov/2013/09
/24/one-nation-in-support-of-biomedical-research/ [https://perma.cc/GL4Q-W9UG].
32. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 28, at vi.
33. Id. at 5–6.
34. See, e.g., John Carroll, “Frustrated” NIH Chief Plots $1B Drug Development
Effort, FIERCEBIOTECH (Jan. 24, 2011, 8:18 AM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story
/frustrated-nih-chief-plots-1b-drug-development-effort/2011-01-24 [https://perma.cc/WX9JPSQJ] (discussing Francis Collins’s announced frustration with private sector translation
efforts and his plan to support translational efforts through the new National Center for
Advancing Translational Sciences).

95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016)

2016]

PRE-COMPETITION

77

A. Emergence of Pre-Competitive Strategies in Biopharma
Pharmaceutical firms have a long history of collaborating with
academic researchers in early stages of R&D, but the recent
combination of constrained resources, rising costs, unmet medical
needs, and expansive scientific opportunities has fueled an increased
interest in collaboration in both the public and private sectors.35
While some pharmaceutical industry collaborations are simply efforts
to expand traditional partnering arrangements between industry and
academia, there has been a significant expansion of alternative
models of cross-industry collaboration including strategic alliances,
open innovation approaches, and—increasingly—what the biopharma
industry refers to as pre-competitive collaborations.36
Genomics was home to the earliest and largest efforts to
collaborate in pre-competitive space. The groundwork for this
collaboration was laid by the Human Genome Project (“HGP”), the
ambitious, multinational, publicly funded project that raced private
sector efforts to sequence the human genome in the late 1990s and
early 2000s.37 As a publicly funded project shaped by principles of
open access and knowledge sharing, the HGP insisted that its
participating sequencing centers release all human sequence data to
the public within twenty-four hours after being generated under a
data release protocol known as the Bermuda Principles.38 Eventually,
even the private sector participants in the race to sequence the

35. See, e.g., John A. Wagner, Open-Minded to Open Innovation and Precompetitive
Collaboration, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 511, 514 (2010)
(“Precompetitive collaboration is increasingly recognized as a driver for enhanced
efficiency, while simultaneously increasing our grasp of heightened complexity.”).
36. See, e.g., Isa Khanna, Drug Discovery in Pharmaceutical Industry: Productivity
Challenges and Trends, 17 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1088, 1093–94 tbl.1 (cataloging
numerous precompetitive collaborations in the biopharma industry); Mittleman et al.,
supra note 23, at 979–80 (identifying five strategic avenues of industry innovation,
including independent operation, mergers and aquisitions, and three cooperative models);
Asher Mullard, Partnering Between Pharma Peers on the Rise, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 561, 561–62 (2011) (discussing growth in pharma-pharma collaborations,
including analysis of an early model provided by the Dundee Kinase Consortium).
37. For general histories of the HGP, see generally JAMES SHREEVE, THE GENOME
WAR (2004) and VICTOR K. MCELHENY, DRAWING THE MAP OF LIFE—INSIDE THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (2010). Planning for the HGP began in the late 1980s and is
generally agreed to have concluded the early 2000s, though work continues to refine the
human genomic map. MCELHENY, supra, at ix–x.
38. Summary of Principles Agreed at the First International Strategy Meeting on
Human Genome Sequencing, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO. ARCHIVE, http://
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/research/bermuda.shtml [https://perma.cc
/NQX4-UDVQ]; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the
Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 84–85 (2011).
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genome were persuaded to deposit their sequence data in the publicly
accessible GenBank database.39
Much has been written about the scientific advances enabled by
the culture of rapid and widespread data sharing fostered by the
HGP.40 This data sharing ethos spread from the government and
academic labs first involved in the HGP to select industry research
labs, resulting in a series of innovative pre-competitive data sharing
initiatives that sought to preserve free and unrestricted access to basic
information about the human genome. Public efforts to sequence the
human genome were thus accompanied by industry-driven
and-funded collaborations designed to gather and make additional
genomic data public, often in efforts to preempt the patenting of
genetic information by others.41 One prominent example was the SNP
Consortium (“TSC”), an early stage, basic science collaboration that
worked alongside the HGP to release DNA marker data to the
public.42
In these early collaborations, the term “pre-competitive” was
used largely to refer to the nature of the genomic data that was being
gathered and shared. Genomic data was seen as constituting a base of
common scientific knowledge upon which firms could later build
competitive product and service offerings. Innovations in the ways
that genomics data could be created, gathered, sorted, and shared
facilitated the growth of genomics-based cross-industry initiatives.43
39. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 85 n.101.
40. See, e.g., Francis Collins, Opinion: Has the Revolution Arrived?, 464 NATURE 674,
675 (referring to the “radical ethic of immediate data deposit adopted by the [HGP]” as
the current “norm for other community research projects”); Jane Kaye et al., Data Sharing
in Genomics—Re-shaping Scientific Practice, 10 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 331, 332 box 1
(2009) (“These policies have created a climate in which data sharing has become the
default, and [grant] applicants must demonstrate why their data should be exempt from
the requirement that it should be deposited for use by other scientists.”); Nikos C.
Kyrpides, Fifteen Years of Microbial Genomics: Meeting the Challenges and Fulfilling the
Dream, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 627, 627 (2009) (“Over time, as the substantial
benefits of prepublication release of genome data have been recognized, many funding
agencies and most of the large sequencing centers now adhere to the rapid data release
policy set forth as the Bermuda Principles in 1996 and renewed in 2003.”); Heidi L.
Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome,
121 J. POL. ECON., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 1, http://economics.mit.edu/files/8647 [https://perma.cc
/WB5J-3YVH].
41. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 85–86.
42. See infra Section I.C.1.
43. For a discussion of some of these data sharing initiatives, see Nicole Szlezak et al.,
The Role of Big Data and Advanced Analytics in Drug Discovery, Development and
Commercialization, 95 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 492, 492 (2014);
Robin Robinson, A New Era of Collaboration: Knowledge Sharing, PHARMAVOICE (Oct.
2014), http://www.pharmavoice.com/article/knowledge-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/L2GD-3JDP].
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These early pre-competitive collaborations informed strategies to
create similar open and shared spaces in other areas of biomedical
R&D.
Budget constraints and soaring development costs made precompetitive strategies attractive to pharmaceutical firms in areas
beyond genomics because of the strategies’ efficiency.44 Such
strategies appeal to firms eager to distribute the costs and risks
involved in R&D among multiple industry participants in ways that
do not compromise their own competitive advantages.45
Pre-competitive collaborations have also been attractive to
government policymakers interested in accelerating pharmaceutical
innovation in cost effective ways.46 Dr. Francis Collins, as director of
the National Human Genome Research Institute from 1993 to 2008,
was an early advocate of pre-competitive collaborations as a
mechanism for accelerating biomedical research.47 As the current
director of the NIH, Dr. Collins continues to advocate for precompetitive collaboration strategies to identify promising therapeutic
targets and biomarkers.48 The Accelerating Medicines Partnership
(“AMP”), a collaboration among pharmaceutical firms and the NIH

44. See, e.g., Sally Rockey & Francis Collins, One Nation in Support of Biomedical
Research?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Sept. 24, 2013), https://nexus.od.nih.gov/all/2013/09
/24/one-nation-in-support-of-biomedical-research/ [https://perma.cc/G6P6-VVNS]; see also
Hamilton Moses et al., The Anatomy of Medical Research: US and International
Comparisons, 313 JAMA 174, 174, 185 (2015) (examining trends in U.S. and international
research funding, showing a decline in growth of U.S. funding and a shift away from earlystage research funding, and suggesting the United States will lose its lead in biomedical
innovation without a change in investment trends).
45. See IOM 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at 10–19 (examining examples from other
industries engaging in pre-competitive collaborations and identifying best practices and a
framework for cross-industry sharing of biological resources).
46. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and
the State, in GOVERNING MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS (Brett Frischmann, Michael
Madison & Katherine Strandburg eds., Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2017) (discussing
governmental interventions in biomedical data generation projects in fields including
genomics and clinical trials).
47. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins et al., A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research,
422 NATURE 835, 839, 844 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Continuing America’s Leadership in Medical Innovation for Patients:
Hearing Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions Comm., 114th Cong. 4 (2015),
http://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/continuing-americas-leadershipmedical-innovation-patients [https://perma.cc/HB9H-YD3R] (testimony of Francis S.
Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health) (discussing Accelerating Medicines
Partnership, a pre-competitive partnership, with the hope that “[t]hrough this truly
innovative and collaborative approach, we believe we can learn how to treat and cure
disease faster”).
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to identify drug targets for four identified disease categories, provides
one example.49
The FDA has also tried to generate private interest in precompetitive collaboration within the biopharma sector. The Critical
Path Initiative (“CPI”), launched by the FDA in 2004, provides a
concrete example of the FDA’s commitment to fostering precompetitive collaborations as part of a larger mission of
“[t]ransforming the way FDA-regulated products are developed,
evaluated and manufactured.”50 The primary goal of the CPI was to
encourage industry members to share data, expertise, and resources
in order to produce more reliable testing methods.51 As part of these
efforts, the FDA subsequently formed the Critical Path Institute, a
nonprofit organization charged with identifying and seeking to
overcome barriers to industry collaboration to address what it
characterized as “pre-competitive regulatory science issues,”
“focusing on standards, applied science, and technology that advance
the field for all stakeholders and benefit the public.”52
In line with the goals of the CPI and the efforts of the Critical
Path Institute, the FDA has subsequently sought to foster precompetitive collaboration through both direct funding of partnerships
and indirect, but public, support of pharmaceutical industry
initiatives.53 One such initiative is the international Serious Adverse
Events Consortium (“iSAEC”), which has sought to identify and
release to the public genetic markers associated with serious adverse
drug reactions, an area that is central to the FDA’s public health and
safety mission.54 In each of these instances, the status of an activity as
pre-competitive has played a role in the FDA support. The next

49. See Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 1549; see also infra Section I.C.3.
50. See Critical Path Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/ [https://perma.cc/48NL-G6YC] (last
updated Oct. 23, 2015).
51. See, e.g., Raymond L. Woosley, Richard T. Myers & Federico Goodsaid, The
Critical Path Institute’s Approach to Pre-competitive Sharing and Advancing Regulatory
Science, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 530, 530–31 (2010).
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See generally, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CRITICAL PATH INITIATIVE REPORT ON
PROJECTS RECEIVING CRITICAL PATH SUPPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT (2010), http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/UCM249262
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMX6-5LXN] (reporting on projects supported by CPI during the
2010 fiscal year).
54. See infra Section I.C.2.; see also Arthur L. Holden et al., The International Serious
Adverse Events Consortium, 13 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 795, 795 (2014);
Contreras, supra note 46, at 18 (discussing the FDA’s role in iSAEC).
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Section discusses the evolving understanding of the term “precompetitive” in the biopharma industry.
B.

Evolving Uses of the Term “Pre-Competitive”

Although the term “pre-competitive” is used widely in the
biopharma literature, it does not have a single, generally accepted
definition. A survey of ways in which the biopharma industry is using
the term suggests a common industry understanding of precompetitive as covering activities and results that are generated
through a cooperative process by industry stakeholders and which
have broad application to the industry as a whole.55 To illustrate, a
sample of definitions of pre-competitive provided by pharmaceutical
firms, FDA commentators, and NIH commentators includes: “science
participated in collaboratively by those who ordinarily are
commercial competitors,”56 “competitors sharing early stages of
research that benefit all,”57 collaborations involved in “aggregating,
accessing, and sharing data that are essential to innovation, but
provide little competitive advantage,”58 and “standards, data, or
processes that are common across an industry and where the
adoption, use, or prosecution of which provides no competitive
advantage relative to peers.”59 In the descriptions provided by
industry stakeholders, pre-competitive collaborations are almost
always portrayed as complements to market competition,60 allowing
firms to pool costs and risks in areas that offer little individual
competitive advantage in order to enhance competition in

55. Our informal survey of the use of the term included a literature search of
biopharma industry publications, NIH, FDA, and federal government policy papers, and
participation in conference presentations and workshops involving the study and
evaluation of some of the existing pre-competitive collaborations.
56. Woodcock, supra note 22, at 521 (describing emergence of pre-competitive
collaborations in biomedicine and their defining features).
57. See, e.g., John A. Wagner et al., The Biomarkers Consortium: Practice and Pitfalls
of Open-Source Precompetitive Collaboration, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 539, 539 (2010) (describing the Biomarkers Consortium as one example
of a pre-competitive collaboration that is driving innovation and increasing productivity).
58. See About the Pistoia Alliance, PISTOIA ALLIANCE, http://www.pistoiaalliance.org
/about/ [https://perma.cc/W8R7-7SLS] (describing the alliance’s mission to transform
R&D innovation through pre-competitive collaboration).
59. See Chris Waller, Precompetitive Collaborations 2 (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www
.slideshare.net/wallerc/precompetitive-collaborations [https://perma.cc/J8Z4-8QAB].
60. See, e.g., Mittleman et al., supra note 23, at 979 (“[D]espite the formation of
consortia as a complement to market competition and government regulation in recent
years, too few [consortia] exist to mitigate lost opportunities and deliver on other potential
mutual gains for public and private stakeholders in the drug development enterprise.”).
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downstream areas where they can most effectively exploit their
competitive advantages.
From this shared starting point, various definitions of precompetition within the biopharma literature emphasize one or more
of the following aspects of the collaboration: (1) the types of
activities, data, or research plans that are being shared; (2) the rules
governing the protection and sharing of results; and (3) the nature of
the participants within the collaboration.
Many definitions of pre-competition, including those offered by
pharmaceutical firms when describing their own initiatives, focus on
the first category: the nature of the activity or type of data being
shared, designating certain activities and types of data as precompetitive. As noted above, early pre-competitive collaborations in
the biopharma industry focused on collecting and sharing data about
the human genome, which was considered by many industry
stakeholders to be “fundamentally pre-competitive information.”61
Technologies enabling the accumulation of massive amounts of
biological data have heralded the growth of “Big Data” opportunities
in drug discovery and development, but harnessing the benefits of big
data for pharmaceutical R&D requires collaboration in data pooling,
data sharing, and the development of tools for effective data use.62
Some definitions of pre-competition focus on the distinction between
pre-competitive tools and resulting products, further distinguishing
between technologies that are tied to differentiating strategies and
those that are generally enabling with potential wide use across the
industry.63 This effort to differentiate based on the type of technology
depends heavily on the perspectives of different stakeholders,
however, since many of the tools regarded as generally enabling
inputs by pharmaceutical companies are the object of intense
competition by those producing the tools.64

61. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins, Michael Morgan & Aristides Patrinos, The Human
Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 300 SCIENCE 286, 288 (2003).
62. See, e.g., Kara Dolinski & Olga G. Troyanskaya, Implications of Big Data for Cell
Biology, 26 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 2575, 2575–76 (2015) (discussing big
data and its implications in biological research); see also Peter Tormay, Big Data in
Pharmaceutical R&D: Creating a Sustainable R&D Engine, 29 PHARMACEUTICAL MED.
87, 87, 91 (2015) (discussing opportunities that “Big Data” offers for improving
productivity of pharmaceutical R&D and need for pre-competitive collaboration to utilize
these opportunities).
63. See, e.g., Christopher J. Welch, Joel M. Hawkins & Jean Tom, Precompetitive
Collaboration on Enabling Technologies for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 ORGANIC
PROCESS RES. DEV. 481, 482 (2014).
64. See, e.g., id.
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One of the most dominant themes in FDA and NIH descriptions
of pre-competitive collaboration is the idea that research data and
other results that are publicly shared will broadly benefit the industry.
This mindset, with its focus on rules for governing public access, likely
finds its roots in the HGP’s aggressive data release programs65 and
continues in current NIH policies on genomic data release.66 Today,
an emphasis on public access to research results pervades much of the
reasoning offered by U.S. biomedical research agencies regarding
pre-competitive collaboration. For example, Dr. Francis Collins
describes the AMP as a pre-competitive partnership characterized by
combined public and private sector efforts to identify promising
therapeutic targets and to openly share these findings with the
public.67 Janet Woodcock, the director of the FDA Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research emphasizes the importance of making
research results publicly available.68 She explains, “In contrast to the
guarded nature of commercial scientific findings, the results of
precompetitive research are meant to be made publicly available,
subjected to scientific scrutiny, and contribute to knowledge that
improves the prospects for invention-based competition . . . .”69 She is
careful, however, to distinguish between research that provides
generally applicable tools and techniques and results that are focused
on the development of a specific product.70
The nature of the participants also influences the perception of a
collaboration as being pre-competitive. Many collaborations
described as pre-competitive involve some form of university or
governmental involvement.71 Academic participants in collaborations
may harbor different understandings of what pre-competitive means,

65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345, 51,352
(Aug. 28, 2014) (“[B]asic sequence data and certain related information (e.g., genotypes,
haplotypes, p-values, allele frequencies) are precompetitive. Such data made available
through NIH-designated data repositories, and all conclusions derived directly from them,
should remain freely available without any licensing requirements.”).
67. See infra Section I.C.3; see also Driving Innovation Through Federal Investments,
Hearing Before the S. Appropriations Comm., 113th Cong. 7 (2014), http://www
.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hearings/NIH%20written%20testimony%20for
%204%2029%20SAC%20Hearing%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/UQ3C-FEAZ]
(testimony of Francis S. Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health).
68. See Woodcock, supra note 22, at 521.
69. Id.
70. See id. (“Precompetitive research is a subset of translational research that is
focused on improving the tools and techniques needed for successful translation, and not
on development of a specific product.”).
71. See, e.g., IOM 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at 16–17.
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but to outsiders much academic research activity would likely be
considered pre-competitive.72
In addition to variations in characterizing the defining features of
pre-competitive collaborations, there has been a trend toward more
expansive views of what is considered pre-competitive.73 As interest
in pre-competitive collaborations has grown among both public and
private stakeholders, so too has a willingness to conceptualize precompetition in broader terms, as “pre-competitive spaces” that can be
created through collaboration. In the medical device context, such
pre-competitive spaces have been referred to by the FDA as “[a]reas
of research and development that possess common aspects across an
industry segment not tied to a proprietary device.”74 According to one
Pfizer executive, “[t]he basic biology, the understanding of disease,
biomarkers of prognosis, and even drug responses all can be areas of
pre-competitive R&D.”75 He goes on to explain that areas that Pfizer
may currently consider to be competitive could eventually become
areas of pre-competitive R&D.76
This evolution in thinking treats the contours of pre-competition
as an industry choice rather than an objective standard. As described
by several industry experts, “Consortia offer unique opportunities for
stakeholders to redefine the precompetitive space, develop new work
streams and jointly produce tools and resources.”77 Others have urged
a “reboot” of the pharmaceutical industry by “extending the notion of
‘precompetitive’ collaboration to encompass later stages of research
to allow [public-private partnerships] to flourish.”78 One ambitious
initiative called Arch2POCM imagined a world of drug discovery and
development in which all R&D work up to and including Phase II
clinical trials would be considered pre-competitive.79 Removing data
access and intellectual property restrictions from essential parts of the

72. See, e.g., id. Note the chapter title “Requisites for Successful Pre-competitive
Collaboration—Requisites from Academia” suggests that the term “pre-competitive” may
have a different meaning in academia than it does in industry. See id. at 13.
73. See, e.g., id. at 3.
74. See, e.g., James Coburn, Digital Library of Modeling and Simulation: Who, What,
When, Where, How 4 (June 11, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices
/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM358859.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RXC-84L4].
75. IOM 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at 13–14.
76. See id. at 14.
77. Mittleman et al., supra note 23, at 980.
78. Elkins et al., supra note 6, at 268.
79. See, e.g., Chris Cain, Making the Case for Precompetitive Clinical Development, 4
SCIBX 1, 1 (2011).
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Arch2POCM plan would create a broad pre-competitive environment
for drug discovery and development.80
C.

Three Examples of Pre-Competitive Collaboration

Early successes with pre-competitive collaborations have fueled
efforts to expand the number of pre-competitive collaborations81 and
to expand the boundaries of pre-competitive spaces.82 New industrydriven pre-competitive initiatives continue to emerge in a wide range
of areas, all the way from developing improved mouse models of
disease to sharing data about adverse reactions to approved drugs.83
This Section provides three detailed examples of biopharma precompetitive collaborations that draw increasingly closer to the
product commercialization path: (1) TSC, a collaboration focused on
early-stage scientific research; (2) iSAEC, an industry effort to
identify genetic markers for serious adverse reactions to approved
drugs; and (3) the AMP, a pharmaceutical collaboration to identify
drug targets for four identified disease categories. These examples
illustrate the ways in which industry participants have thought about
and organized pre-competitive activities at different stages along the
biopharma R&D life cycle.
1. Early-Stage Scientific Research: The SNP Consortium
The SNP Consortium, or TSC, is one of the earliest examples of
the use of pre-competitive collaboration strategies in the biopharma
industry. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”) are single base
pair variations in the human genome that occur on average once
every 300–1,000 nucleotides.84 They are the most common form of
human genetic variation, serving as milestones or markers across the
human genome.85 TSC was established in 1999 as a two-year, $45
million initiative funded by a group of leading pharmaceutical and
information technology firms and the Wellcome Trust to build a high-

80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Mittleman et al., supra note 23, at 980 (arguing for the need for more
pre-competitive collaborations).
82. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 79, at 2.
83. See, e.g., Chris Cain, A Mind for Precompetitive Collaboration, 19 SCIBX 1, 1
(2012) (examining increase in pre-competitive consortia backed by industry).
84. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HELP ME UNDERSTAND GENETICS 208
(2016); see also Arthur L. Holden, The SNP Consortium: Summary of a Private
Consortium Effort to Develop an Applied Map of the Human Genome, 32
BIOTECHNIQUES (SUPP.) S22, S22 (2002).
85. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 84, at 208.
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density map of SNPs along the human genome.86 The project was
motivated by the hope that these SNPs could later be used to help
identify genetic differences associated with disease and individual
variations in treatment.87
TSC built upon and complemented the work being done by the
HGP. Its initial goal was to identify up to 300,000 SNPs throughout
the human genome and to map at least half of these.88 An
unexpectedly large influx of genomic data from the HGP enabled
TSC to exceed its original goals, and by 2001 researchers had
cataloged the locations of 1.4 million SNPs along the human
genome.89 As SNPs were identified, they were validated, mapped, and
deposited in publicly available databases maintained by the
consortium and NIH’s National Center for Biotechnology
Information.90 TSC made the data publicly available with no early
access by participating firms.91
In contrast to the HGP, which was largely government funded
and government driven, TSC was a private sector initiative. Its
backers were comprised of ten of the world’s largest pharmaceutical
firms, two large information technology firms, and the Wellcome
Trust, one of the world’s largest medical research charities.92 It was
financed through member contributions, with each member required
to provide financial support and contribute to the collaborative
management of the project.93 Membership was open, but interested
parties were required to provide the required financial and non-

86. John Hodgson, Analysts, Firms Pour Cold Water on SNP Consortium, 17 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 526, 526 (1999).
87. See Human Genome Project and SNP Consortium Announce Collaboration to
Identify New Genetic Markers for Disease, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (July
2000), http://www.genome.gov/10001456 [https://perma.cc/SFE7-5KU2].
88. See, e.g., Gudmundur A. Thorisson & Lincoln D. Stein, The SNP Consortium
Website: Past, Present and Future, 31 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 124, 124 (2003).
89. Ten Vignettes: Stories of Genetic Discovery, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST.
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.genome.gov/10003809#al-10 [https://perma.cc/BU6Q-TH2F].
90. See Stephen T. Sherry et al., dbSNP: The NCBI Database of Genetic Variation, 29
NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 308, 308 (2001).
91. See Holden, supra note 84, at S23.
92. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 96 n.146 (“The SNP Consortium Ltd. was
incorporated in March 1999 with the following sponsoring (i.e., dues-paying) members:
The Wellcome Trust Limited, Pfizer Inc., Glaxo Wellcome Inc., Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Zeneca Inc., Hoffman-La Roche Inc., Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, BristolMyers Squibb Company, SmithKline Beecham Corporation, Bayer Corporation and
Monsanto Corporation. Technology giants Motorola, Inc. and International Business
Machines Corporation joined as sponsoring members in November 1999 and Amersham
Pharmacia Biotech Inc. became a sponsoring member in 2001.”).
93. See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note 86, at 526.
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financial resources in order to become members.94 The ten
pharmaceutical companies who were part of the founding group were
each reported to have contributed $3 million to TSC’s budget.95 TSC
was overseen by a board of directors comprised of one member from
each dues-paying member organization.96 The CEO and chairman of
TSC was independent of any member organization and the sole
employee of the consortium.97
The founders’ underlying motivation behind TSC was to
accelerate the discovery and publication of SNP data in order to
ensure that it remained accessible to researchers and the industry free
from patent encumbrances.98 TSC adopted a multi-prong approach to
ensure that the SNP data it discovered would not be patented.99 First,
it contractually prohibited the academic researchers performing SNP
discovery and mapping activity from seeking patent protection on
their discoveries.100 Second, it released all SNP data it discovered to
public databases, thus creating voluminous prior art.101 Finally, it
adopted a novel “protective” patenting strategy in which it filed
patent applications disclosing all newly identified and mapped SNPs
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in order to enter
this data into the PTO prior art database and to establish clear
priority dates to defeat later patent applications.102 These patent
applications were later converted into Statutory Invention
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. SNP Consortium Announced, BIOPROCESS ONLINE (Apr. 19, 1999), http://www
.bioprocessonline.com/doc/snp-consortium-announced-0001 [https://perma.cc/59SN-J8LK].
97. See id. (“The SNP Consortium is a non profit entity . . . with an independent
chairman.”).
98. See, e.g., Holden, supra note 84, at S26 (“The overall IP objective is to maximize
the number of SNPs that (i) enter the public domain at the earliest possible date, and, (ii)
are free of third-party encumbrances such that the map can be used by all without
financial or other IP obligations.”).
99. TSC’s patent deterrence strategies are described in detail in Contreras, supra note
38, at 96–97. Contreras served as TSC’s legal counsel responsible for developing and
overseeing the implementation of these strategies. TSC’s defensive patenting strategy has
also been favorably cited in Robert Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 189–91 (2004), and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of
Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2358, 2368–69 (2000).
100. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 121–22.
101. Id. at 96–97.
102. See id. Although any genomic data released to the public (e.g., through NIH’s
GenBank database) can act as prior art defeating a later patent application, it is often
inconvenient for patent examiners to search databases external to the PTO. Moreover, it
is often difficult to establish the precise date that data was uploaded to a particular public
database. For these reasons, TSC elected to submit its SNP data directly to the PTO by
means of provisional patent applications. See id. at 97.

95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016)

88

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

Registrations (“SIRs”) or, following the 1999 Patent Act amendments
providing for the publication of patent applications after eighteen
months,103 abandoned.104 None of the TSC applications were
prosecuted to issuance, but instead TSC utilized the PTO publication
system to deter independent patenting of the discovered SNPs.105
Despite this program of patent deterrence with respect to the
basic SNP data and map generated by TSC, the consortium made it
clear that TSC participants were free to pursue patents based on
discoveries made using SNPs.106 Thus, the SNP map created by TSC
was intended to act as a public research tool, but not to prevent
patenting of downstream diagnostics or therapeutics developed by
TSC participants or by others.
Given the participation of private firms representing a large
share of the worldwide pharmaceutical market, TSC was careful from
the outset to implement policies and practices designed to reduce the
risk of antitrust liability. It filed public notices of its membership
under the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1984
(“NCRPA”) with the attorney general and the FTC, entitling it to
certain immunities from enhanced antitrust damages.107 It also
adopted an antitrust compliance policy prohibiting its members from
exchanging competitive information in connection with any TSC
activity and otherwise from engaging in anticompetitive or collusive
behavior under the auspices of TSC.108
While taking these natural steps to preempt antitrust concern
about a consortium of competitors sharing information, TSC also
relied on its characterization as a pre-competitive collaboration to
ameliorate antitrust concerns.109 Consortium members that were
103. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Appendix I
§ 4502, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-561 to -563 (1999) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122
(2012)).
104. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 97 n.151 (explaining how abandonment of
published patent applications following the 1999 amendments accomplished largely the
same disclosure goals as filing of a statutory invention registration prior to the
amendments which provided for the publication of U.S. applications).
105. See id. at 97 & n.151.
106. See, e.g., National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research Summary of
Meeting, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST. (May 17–18, 1999), http://www
.genome.gov/10001364 [https://perma.cc/W5A4-A4MJ] (summarizing a presentation by
TSC Chairman and CEO, Arthur Holden, to advisory council on the formation and
structure of TSC).
107. See infra Section II.B.1.
108. The SNP Consortium Ltd., Compliance Guidelines (1999) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
109. See, e.g., National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research Summary of
Meeting, supra note 106.
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industry competitors treated the SNP map as a pre-competitive
research tool, with open access to the data produced guaranteed from
the outset.110
TSC has been cited as a leading example of early-stage precompetitive collaboration directed at the development of basic
research tools and scientific data.111 It also provided a model for
subsequent pre-competitive collaborations, such as iSAEC, to build
upon.112
2. Taking the Model Downstream: The International Serious
Adverse Events Consortium
Between 1976 and 2007 twenty-eight drugs were withdrawn from
the U.S. market for safety reasons, including the occurrence of serious
adverse events (“SAEs”) that were not fully appreciated during
clinical trials.113 SAEs of some pharmaceutical products have included
birth defects, liver damage, serious skin rash, kidney and renal injury,
cardiac irregularity, and psychological effects. While some SAEs may
be predictable based on the properties of a drug, many may instead
be idiosyncratic, with predisposing genotypes.114 Identifying genetic
risk factors for SAEs would therefore have significant benefits for
patient care, pharmaceutical developers, and drug safety regulators.115
For these reasons, drug safety has become a high priority for the
FDA.116
Nevertheless, historically it has been difficult to study SAEs in
the field. Cases are relatively rare, occur sporadically around the
world, are often undiagnosed or misdiagnosed by clinicians to whom
symptoms are presented, are not classified or reported in a uniform

110. Minna Allarakhia, Open Source Biopharmaceutical Innovation—A Mode of Entry
for Firms in Emerging Markets, 6 J. BUS. CHEMISTRY 11, 17 (2009).
111. Whitehead Human Genome Project and SNP Consortium Announce Collaboration to
Identify New Genetic Markers for Disease and Enhance Utility of Human Genome “Working
Draft”, WHITEHEAD INST. (July 11, 2000), http://wi.mit.edu/news/archive/2012/whiteheadhuman-genome-project-and-snp-consortium-announce-collaboration-identify [https://perma
.cc/M43E-T8LQ] (quoting Chairman and CEO of TSC Arthur Holden).
112. Contreras, supra note 38, at 102–04.
113. See, e.g., Russell A. Wilke et al., Identifying Genetic Risk Factors for Serious
Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Progress and Challenges, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG
DISCOVERY 904, 905 (2007).
114. Id. at 904.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Janet Woodcock, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
FDA, Statement before Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions,
(Feb. 1, 2000), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115007.htm [https://perma.cc
/U2ES-2ME9].
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manner, and may be caused by a number of different but chemically
related pharmaceutical products.117 Collecting adequate numbers of
cases and DNA samples from affected patients, and analyzing and
determining the genetic factors that may underlie SAEs, requires a
level of cross-industry collaboration hitherto unseen in the biopharma
industry.118
The impetus for the international Serious Adverse Events
Consortium, or iSAEC, arose from recognition by the FDA and
industry that collaboration was essential to determine whether a
genetic basis existed for certain drug-induced SAEs.119 Drug safety
assessment was seen by industry stakeholders as “a major area of precompetitive research . . . since the development of new approaches to
predict potential side effects is of paramount importance to reduce
late-stage drug failures, a shared concern for patients, industry and
regulatory authorities alike.”120
iSAEC is a non-profit corporation formed in 2007 with the goal
of identifying genetic variants useful in understanding the risk of
drug-related SAEs.121 iSAEC was launched with the financial and
scientific support of six pharmaceutical firms.122 Three more
pharmaceutical firms and the Wellcome Trust were added after the
consortium concluded a preliminary research program.123 Three
associate but non-dues-paying and non-voting members also joined
following this initial research phase.124 The FDA is actively involved
in the consortium as an observer, advisor, and collaborator but does
not have formal membership status.125 iSAEC membership now
includes nine of the largest U.S., European, and Japanese
pharmaceutical firms; two large information technology providers; a
U.S. hospital network; and the Wellcome Trust.126 It remains privately
funded by its members, who are either voting or non-voting

117. Wilke et al., supra note 113, at 904.
118. Id. at 905, 912.
119. See Holden et al., supra note 54, at 795.
120. Michael Goldman, Carolyn Compton & Barbara B. Mittleman, Public-Private
Partnerships as Driving Forces in the Quest for Innovative Medicines, 2 CLINICAL &
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 2, 2 (2013).
121. See Holden et al., supra note 54, at 795. At the time this article went to print,
Jorge Contreras served as legal counsel to iSAEC. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Collaborators, INT’L SAE CONSORTIUM, http://www.saeconsortium.org/index
.php?q=node/3 [https://perma.cc/N8VA-ZP99].
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depending on the nature of their contributions.127 The board of
directors includes one representative from each voting member, plus
an independent chairman and CEO.128
Like TSC, iSAEC has made antitrust filings under the NCRPA
and has adopted an antitrust compliance policy prohibiting the
exchange of competitive information by its members and
implementing other measures to reduce the risk and appearance of
improper collusion.129 All board meetings are conducted with the
involvement of legal counsel.130
iSAEC commits to making its research results available to the
public and free of any patent encumbrances using a defensive
patenting strategy based on that of TSC.131 Both members and
collaborators are contractually prohibited from patenting the genetic
associations and related discoveries made with iSAEC support,
although they are not prevented from patenting downstream
discoveries enabled by these findings.132 To ensure that its results
remain in the public domain, iSAEC files U.S. patent applications on
DNA markers identified in its studies with the intention of
abandoning them after publication.133 Users of iSAEC data “must
agree not to seek patents claiming any DNA markers or [genetic]
associations disclosed in, or derived from, the iSAEC data” or any
patents that “would otherwise block access to, or use of, [this]
data.”134 This agreement to preserve the public nature of the results
produced by iSAEC is seen as important in alleviating antitrust
concerns that might otherwise arise from coordination among a group
of competitors.135
Like TSC, iSAEC has helped to develop and refine a model of
pre-competitive collaboration that entails open use research practices
and standards and accompanying limitations on intellectual property
restrictions. These data sharing and patent limitation requirements
127. See Holden et al., supra note 54, at 795.
128. Id.
129. Int’l Severe Adverse Events Consortium, Antitrust Policy (amended Feb. 28,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
130. Author Jorge Contreras serves as legal counsel for iSAEC.
131. See supra Section I.C.1.
132. See Jorge L. Contreras, Aris Floratos & Arthur L. Holden, The International
Serious Adverse Events Consortium’s Data Sharing Model, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 17, 18
(2013) (discussing IP strategy and policies of iSAEC).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 17–18 (“This public commitment of IP serves as a cornerstone of
iSAEC’s charitable tax-exempt status and also alleviates concerns regarding potential
antitrust challenges to this coordinated research activity.”).
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emphasize the “public goods” focus of the collaborations. The
consortium is proposed as a useful reference point for other publicprivate consortia “seeking to facilitate pre-competitive research.”136
3. Expanding the Boundaries of Pre-Competition: The Accelerating
Medicines Partnership
The creation of the Accelerating Medicines Partnership, or
AMP, marked an ambitious effort by the NIH, the FDA, and some of
the world’s largest pharmaceutical firms to push collaborative efforts
downstream into areas of drug discovery and development that were
formerly highly secretive and competitive.137 When AMP was first
launched it was heralded as “the first national cross-sector
partnership of its size and scale” and “the latest initiative in the drug
development market to embrace open data exchange, encouraging
collaboration over competition as pathways for promoting
innovation.”138
AMP was formed in February 2014 as a public-private
partnership among the NIH, the FDA, ten biopharma firms, and
multiple disease advocacy groups and disease research foundations.139
The mission of AMP, and the hope of its NIH advocates, is to provide
a new model for drug discovery and development that involves
collaborating in the identification and validation of promising
biological targets of disease.140 It is promoted as a “precompetitive
collaboration [that] harnesses collective capabilities, scale, and
resources across multiple sectors to improve the therapeutic

136. Id. at 17.
137. See, e.g., Monica Langley & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Drug Companies Join NIH in
Study of Alzheimer’s, Diabetes, Rheumatoid Arthritis, Lupus, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2014,
11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303519404579353442155924498
(“Ten big drug companies that have spent billions racing one another to find
breakthroughs on diseases like Alzheimer’s have formed an unusual pack to cooperate on
a government-backed effort to accelerate the discovery of new medicines.”).
138. See, e.g., Aaron Kesselheim & Yongtian Tan, Accelerating Medicines Partnership:
A New Public-Private Collaboration for Drug Discovery, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 8,
2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/04/08/accelerating-medicines-partnership-a-newpublic-private-collaboration-for-drug-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/KT3N-BZ45].
139. For a list of memberships and a description of AMP, see Accelerating Medicines
Partnership, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/research-training/acceleratingmedicines-partnership-amp [https://perma.cc/W3BF-75MG]. Current industry members of
AMP include: AbbVie, Biogen, Bristol-Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson &
Johnson, Lilly, Merck, Pfizer, Sanofi, and Takeda. Id.
140. Id.
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development efforts for complex, heterogeneous diseases.”141 AMP is
focusing initially on three disease areas that share attributes of
complexity, high risk, high cost, significant amounts of data, a track
record of failed industry efforts, and significant public need for
therapies.142 These characteristics create fertile ground for new
collaborative models.
AMP takes the form of a five-year agreement among ten large
pharmaceutical firms, the NIH, and a number of disease-based
foundations to collaborate in identifying promising drug and
diagnostic targets to treat four diseases—Alzheimer’s, type 2
diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and lupus.143 The collaboration is
managed by the Foundation for the NIH, an independent tax-exempt
organization.144 Funding for the initiative is shared fairly equally
between public and private participants, with the NIH providing
$121.5 million over five years, the ten pharmaceutical firms providing
$110.6 million and patient advocacy groups providing $1.6 million.145
Participants are expected to pool not just funds, but also expertise,
data, and other resources.146 AMP is structured as an umbrella
partnership for the three initial programs focusing on separate disease
areas.147 Each program has its own budget, its own steering committee
comprised of representatives from the NIH, the FDA, participating
industry members and patient advocacy organizations, and its own set
of milestones.148 The steering committees are governed by the AMP
executive committee, which again includes representatives from the
NIH, the FDA, participating industry members, and patient advocacy
organizations.149
The AMP arrangement took more than two years of intense
negotiations to conclude, and it ultimately focuses on areas that are
both of significant public health concern and in which pharmaceutical
firms have struggled in their individual discovery and development

141. What Is AMP?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/alzheimers/amp-ad
?utm_source=20150305_AMP&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ealert [https://
perma.cc/93JW-DMNX].
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Langley & Rockoff, supra note 138.
144. See Accelerating Medicines Partnership, supra note 139.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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efforts.150 Each disease area has its own pilot program lasting between
three and five years, complete with a research plan and set of
milestones designed to characterize biomarkers of disease and disease
progression and to identify biological targets most likely to respond to
new therapies.151 The pilot project for Alzheimer’s disease received
the bulk of the AMP funding.152 This project involves searching for
new biomarkers for disease progression through four NIH-funded
clinical trials designed to test ways to delay or prevent disease
onset.153 The project also includes analysis of shared brain tissue
samples from Alzheimer’s patients to validate jointly identified
biological targets, develop new models of late-onset Alzheimer’s
disease, and screen compounds provided by collaborators against
novel disease targets.154
The type 2 diabetes project will collect and pool genetic and
clinical data on patients provided by collaborators or developed
through project studies with the goal of finding and validating
promising molecules and pathways as targets for therapeutic
development.155 The NIH National Institute of Diabetes and
Digestive and Kidney Diseases (“NIDDK”) will provide “a website
that will function as a ‘smart PubMed’, gathering all of the genetic
and patient data from ongoing and completed trials.”156 The third
pilot, focusing on rheumatoid arthritis and lupus, will analyze single
cells from newly collected tissue and blood samples to better
understand the diseases and aid in the search for new drug targets.157
150. Industry and Non-Profits Join Forces to Speed Validation of Disease Targets,
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/feb2014/od04.htm [https://perma.cc/5PD5-N3SP].
151. See Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH, 10 Drug Companies Partner to Study Four Diseases,
SCIENCE (Feb. 4, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/02/nih-10-drugcompanies-partner-study-four-diseases [https://perma.cc/ZDM8-AYBL].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Accelerating Medicines Partnership: Type 2 Diabetes, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/research-training/accelerating-medicines-partnership-amp/type
-2-diabetes#approach [https://perma.cc/J2ZP-HUM6].
156. See, e.g., Sara Reardon, Pharma Firms Join NIH on Drug Development, NATURE
(Feb. 4, 2014) http://www.nature.com/news/pharma-firms-join-nih-on-drug-development1.14672 [https://perma.cc/3WBU-F394].
157. See Accelerating Medicines Partnership: Autoimmune Diseases of Rheumatoid
Arthritis and Lupus, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/research-training
/accelerating-medicines-partnership-amp/autoimmune-diseases-rheumatoid-arthritis-lupus
[https://perma.cc/CG95-LYVM] (“The partnership will integrate several new or
developing technologies to analyze single cells and groups of cells involved in
autoimmunity in new ways; collect tissue samples, including synovium (the tissue that lines
joints) from people with RA and lupus for molecular analysis; develop computational
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All of these projects include agreements among the collaborators
to contribute financial support and scientists who are experts on the
relevant disease, share research data and tissue and blood samples
with each other and with the public.158 The goal of the project is for
the collaborators to gain a better understanding of how each disease
works through their collaborative efforts and data sharing, to use this
knowledge to identify biological targets that can be attacked with
potential drugs, and to measure how diseases progress and respond to
treatments.159
AMP has been characterized as pre-competitive both by
reference to the type of data that is being shared and by the public
nature of its results. The NIH has promoted AMP as an arrangement
that should not face antitrust concerns because it involves early, precompetitive research and the results will be made freely available.160
Participants are pooling large quantities of data and engaging in joint
analysis of this data to identify useful biological markers and drug
targets.161 The data that is being shared is described as data that does
not, on its own, convey any competitive advantage for the
participating firms.162 Instead, the parties must work together to
identify useful targets from within this aggregation of data, thus
increasing the odds that they are all picking the right drug targets to
pursue in subsequent private drug development projects.163
The AMP participants are contractually obligated to make all of
the data and methods from the early-stage clinical trials that are
conducted jointly by collaborators in AMP freely available. Only
after the information is published are participants permitted to use
the information in their own proprietary drug programs. As the
projects progress, it is anticipated that participants will shift into
product development activities that are more competitive. The details
of AMP agreements are confidential, but reports suggest that
tools to integrate different data types to characterize molecular pathways; and make the
data available to the broad research community for further analysis.”).
158. See, e.g., Langley & Rockoff, supra note138.
159. See id.
160. See id. (“The project shouldn’t face any antitrust concerns, the NIH says, because
it involves early, ‘pre-competitive’ research and will make all results freely available.”); cf.
Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 1549–51.
161. See Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 1549–51.
162. Id. at 1550.
163. See Reardon, supra note 157; see also BioCentury This Week Episode 180: NIH’s
Collins, PhRMA’s Chin Explain Accelerating Medicines Partnership (BCTV television
broadcast Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.biocentury.com/bctvthisweek/all/2014-03-02/nihscollins-phrmas-chin-explain-accelerating-medicines-partnership-bctv [https://perma.cc/64K76DQC].
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participants may obtain proprietary rights over drug candidates and
otherwise stake out proprietary positions in downstream areas of
interest.164
AMP provides an important example of a prominent
pharmaceutical industry collaboration that has stretched the
definition of “pre-competitive” activity far beyond early conceptions
of basic scientific research. As NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins
describes it, “We’re going to increase the odds of picking the right
[drug and diagnostic targets] at the very beginning and avoid wasting
time and money chasing duds,” but once the information from the
early-stage trials is published, “the full competitive power of [the]
pharmaceutical industry can kick in.”165 Inherent in this approach is
the idea that participants can redefine the innovation process to
broaden the areas in which the process is cooperative and narrow the
areas in which the process is competitive. AMP is portrayed as
complementary to the competitive drug development process,
facilitating competition in those areas where it will be most
meaningful.
These examples illustrate the progression of pre-competitive
collaborations in the biopharma industry. While various private and
public policy rationales have been offered in support of precompetitive collaborations, what remains unclear is the degree to
which antitrust law has been taken into account in pre-competitive
collaborations’ structuring and implementation—at least beyond
efforts to characterize the collaborations as pre-competitive.
II. THE ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRY
COLLABORATIONS
As the analysis above suggests, there appears to be a prevailing
intuition among governmental agencies and private sector
participants that pre-competitive collaborations are, by their nature,
procompetitive. While it may indeed be true that many precompetitive collaborations in the biopharma sector offer substantial
procompetitive benefits, it is not necessarily the case that all do.
Rather, each such pre-competitive collaboration must be analyzed
under the existing antitrust law framework that has been established
by statute, case law, and guidance from enforcement agencies. Part II
summarizes the antitrust framework for analyzing collaborations
among competitors. It begins with the general antitrust framework as
164. See Reardon, supra note 156.
165. Id.
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applied to agreements in restraint of trade and then focuses on the
more specialized guidelines and approaches that have been developed
by antitrust authorities to deal with the unique challenges posed by
R&D collaborations and R&D markets.
A. Standard Framework Governing Agreements in Restraint of
Trade: Sherman Act Section 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any “contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”166 Key to the
existence of a violation of section 1 is the existence of concerted
action among two or more firms: an “agreement” in restraint of
trade.167 In addition, in order to be condemned, such an agreement
must be “unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.”168
Finally, as with most antitrust offenses, the parties to such an
agreement must possess sufficient power to distort competitive
processes in one or more markets, otherwise known as “market
power.”169 The prohibition against anticompetitive agreements under
section 1 applies both to agreements among firms at the same level in
the supply chain (i.e., agreements among competitors, or “horizontal”
agreements) as well as to agreements among firms at different levels
of the supply chain (i.e., agreements among suppliers and distributors,
or “vertical” agreements).170
Any agreement having potentially anticompetitive effects would
be analyzed under section 1 using a framework developed by the
courts over the last century. This framework is also employed by the
principal antitrust enforcement agencies, the DOJ Antitrust Division
and the FTC, in assessing whether or not to bring an antitrust
enforcement action in a particular case.
The first step in the antitrust analysis of any agreement is
determining whether it should be deemed illegal per se, or whether it
should be analyzed under the so-called “rule of reason.” Illegality per

166. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
167. See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶ 1400, at 3 (3d ed.
2010).
168. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
169. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,
¶ 500, at 107 (4th ed. 2014); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 187 (2d ed. 2006) (acknowledging
“[p]ower and the potential for or actual abuse of that power is the common thread running
through the fabric of antitrust law”).
170. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 1402, at 11–20.
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se is generally reserved for agreements “whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality.”171 Agreements of a
type that “always or almost always tend to raise prices or reduce
output” are generally deemed to be illegal per se.172 Traditionally,
such agreements have been directed to price fixing, reducing output,
allocating markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.173 While
these activities are still viewed with suspicion, the analysis of illegality
per se has, in recent years, become less mechanistic, and courts have
proven increasingly willing to consider the potential ameliorating
effects of arrangements that might otherwise have been condemned
as per se violations.174
Agreements that are not deemed to be illegal per se are
evaluated under the more flexible rule of reason approach. The rule
of reason is applied to agreements “whose competitive effect can only
be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the
history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.”175 Under
the rule of reason, if a challenged arrangement is found, after all of
the circumstances have been weighed, to “impos[e] an unreasonable
restraint on competition,” it will be deemed illegal.176
As formulated by the Supreme Court and U.S. enforcement
agencies, the central question in a rule of reason analysis is “whether
the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the
ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output,
quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the
absence of the relevant agreement.”177 Factors that are considered in
assessing whether or not an agreement imposes an unreasonable
restraint on competition include “specific information about the
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”178 This
171. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
172. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.2, at 8 (2000).
173. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
174. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma,
468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984) (holding that a collective agreement to limit output (number of
collegiate athletic events broadcast on television) should be analyzed under the rule of
reason because the agreement was arguably necessary for any product to be available at
all); see also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 1509, at 441; SULLIVAN &
GRIMES, supra note 169, at 243–60.
175. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
176. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86
(2007); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
177. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.1, at 7.
178. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
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analysis, as conducted by the agencies with respect to horizontal
agreements, often includes one or more of several considerations:
(a) intent of the parties, (b) limitations on independence and
competition, (c) exchange of information, (d) duration, (e) markets
and market power, and (f) offsetting procompetitive benefits.
While anticompetitive intent alone does not constitute a
violation of the antitrust laws, the intent of the parties in entering into
an agreement is relevant in assessing its likely competitive effects.179
Thus, if evidence of a manifestly anticompetitive intent exists with
regard to the formation of an arrangement among competitors, it is
more likely than not that anticompetitive effects will follow.180 But, by
the same token, evidence of procompetitive intentions will not
necessarily negate the anticompetitive impact of an arrangement
among competitors.181
A second factor is the extent to which agreements impose
limitations on independence and competition among the parties.
Agreements that limit the parties’ independent decision making or
combine control over their production, pricing, assets, or other
competitive factors tend to reduce their incentive or ability to
compete independently, and may thus harm competition.182 Some
agreements expressly or implicitly limit the parties’ ability to compete
in certain markets.183 The degree to which independent competition is
eliminated through an agreement has a direct bearing on its
anticompetitive effect.
The nature and extent of information exchange is a third factor.
The exchange of information is often necessary to achieve the
legitimate purposes of a collaborative business arrangement.
However, when competitively sensitive information such as pricing,
output, customers, and business plans is shared by competitors,
collusion may be facilitated, prices fixed, and competition reduced.184
As noted by the agencies, “The competitive concern depends on the

179. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.31, at 12.
180. See Richard S. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 24 (1981) (noting “[p]urpose is arguably the only reliable guide to the
agreement’s effects. When the record shows that the parties sought to injure
competition . . . it is right to shift the burden of proof to the party who denies that such
effects will follow”).
181. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.
182. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.31, at 12.
183. Id. § 3.34(a), at 19.
184. Id. § 3.31(b), at 15; see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 260–70
(outlining historical development of information exchange cases).
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nature of the information shared.”185 Often, structural features of an
arrangement will offer clues regarding the likelihood that competitive
information will be exchanged among the parties, and safeguards can
be implemented to reduce the likelihood of such exchanges. For
example, if the parties agree not to assign marketing personnel to
participate on committees in an R&D collaboration, then competitive
information is less likely to be exchanged.186 Likewise, competitive
information from the parties can be consolidated by independent
third parties who will then utilize it to advance the collaboration’s
goals.187
Fourth, the duration of an agreement among competitors will
have a bearing on its anticompetitive effect. On balance, short-term
agreements are more likely than long-term agreements to result in the
parties’ competition, both within and outside the field of
collaboration.188 When the duration of a horizontal agreement
exceeds ten years, the agencies are likely to treat the arrangement as
a merger.189
The fifth factor, market power, plays an important role in the
analysis. In order for an agreement to be condemned under the
antitrust laws, the parties must possess sufficient power to distort
competitive processes in one or more markets, otherwise known as
“market power.”190 Market power is often measured by “the ability to
raise price profitably by restricting output.”191 For an agreement to be
condemned under the rule of reason, the parties must be shown both
to have restrained competition in a defined product and geographic
market, and to have played a “significant role in that market.”192
185. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.31(b), at 15–16 (noting current
information is more concerning than historical information, company-specific information
is more concerning than aggregated information).
186. See id. § 3.34(e), at 21.
187. Id.
188. Id. § 3.34(f), at 21.
189. Id. § 1.3, at 4–5 & n.10. Under the agencies’ joint Guidelines for Horizontal
Mergers, the central question for analysis is whether or not a merger between actual or
potential competitors may substantially lessen competition. See FED. TRADE COMM’N &
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR HORIZONTAL MERGERS 1–2 (2010). This
assessment is made under the assumption that “mergers should not be permitted to create,
enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.” Id. at 2.
190. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, ¶ 500, at 107. Note that market definition
and the concept of market power are relevant not only to section 1 concerted conduct
claims, but also to claims of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2012), and to mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). Much
of the literature and analysis concerning market definition arises in the merger context.
191. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, ¶ 501, at 109.
192. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 1503, at 397.
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The definition of product and geographic markets is complex,
fact-intensive, and draws heavily on economic analysis.193 Some of the
principal factors evaluated when defining a product market are the
degree to which different products can function as substitutes for one
another, the degree of price elasticity among different products, and
the degree to which producers can easily shift from production of one
product to another.194 Geographic markets are defined based on the
ability of suppliers to sell beyond their immediate locations, taking
into account factors such as transportation costs, buyer convenience,
and customer preferences.195 This being said, a full-scale economic
analysis of relevant markets is not necessarily required if proof of
actual anticompetitive harm can be shown.196
Once the relevant markets affected by an agreement are defined,
the rule of reason analysis turns to the share of these markets
controlled by the parties and whether the parties possess sufficient
power to adversely affect competition in those markets.197 The
determination of market power involves a fact-specific economic
analysis that considers factors such as: (1) the share of the market
enjoyed by each party and the parties collectively; (2) concentration
of the market; (3) the parties’ ability to extract high profit margins;
(4) barriers to market entry; (5) control over intellectual property;
and (6) behavioral indicators.198 If the collective market shares of the
parties to a horizontal arrangement are sufficiently small, then it may
be presumed that their arrangement, regardless of its other features,
is unlikely to harm competition in the market.199
With these factors in mind, the balancing analysis focuses on any
offsetting procompetitive benefits from the arrangements. In the rule
of reason analysis, the above considerations are analyzed to
determine whether an agreement has, or is likely to have,
anticompetitive effects. If so, then these must be weighed against the
193. See generally AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, pt. 2, ch. 5, at 107–472 (discussing
market structure issues, specifically market power and market definition).
194. See id. ¶¶ 561–63, at 378–418.
195. See id. ¶¶ 552–53, at 344–65.
196. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986).
197. See, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inv. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2004).
198. See generally AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, pt. 2, ch. 5, at 107–234 (discussing
defining market power and alternative non-market-based proofs of market power). See
also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 62–74.
199. Absent price fixing or other illegal per se activity, the agencies generally will not
challenge a competitor collaboration if the collective market shares of the participants are
below twenty percent of the relevant market. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note
19, § 4.2, at 26.
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agreement’s likely procompetitive benefits. Procompetitive benefits
exist when an arrangement is likely to benefit consumers through
lower prices, higher quality, or more rapid product introductions.200 If
the procompetitive benefits of an agreement outweigh its
anticompetitive harm, then the agreement will survive rule of reason
review.
B.

Antitrust Analysis of R&D Collaborations

As discussed in Section II.A above, agreements in restraint of
trade are prohibited under section 1 of the Sherman Act. This Section
applies the general antitrust analysis under section 1 specifically to
R&D collaborations. Collaborative research agreements,201 which
often involve concerted action by competitors (e.g., different
pharmaceutical producers) and parties at different levels of the supply
chain (e.g., universities, pharmaceutical producers, biotechnology
firms, and healthcare providers), can involve both horizontal and
vertical restraints that can give rise to antitrust concern. Some
collaborations may serve as “little more than fronts for cartels” with
no lawful purpose, and others may integrate the participants’
businesses so completely that they are effectively mergers requiring
enhanced antitrust scrutiny.202
However, legitimate collaborative R&D agreements have long
been recognized by courts and antitrust enforcement agencies as
offering significant procompetitive benefits. These agreements have
the potential to spread the financial burden of costly research, to
combine technical skill and knowledge to promote greater innovation,
to accelerate the development of new products, and to lower research
and production costs through economies of scale, thereby increasing
overall social welfare.203 Collaborations that set out to achieve such
goals “often are not only benign but procompetitive.”204 Accordingly,
collaborative agreements are typically reviewed under the rule of
reason.205

200. See id. § 2.1, at 6.
201. Collaborative arrangements are also often referred to in the literature as “joint
ventures.”
202. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 1478a, at 341–42.
203. See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 2115a, at 111–12;
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, pmbl., at 1.
204. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, pmbl., at 1.
205. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Antitrust Immunities, Remarks Prepared for the American Antitrust Institute’s
11th Annual Conference: Public and Private: Are the Boundaries in Transition? 5 (June

95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016)

2016]

PRE-COMPETITION

103

1. Joint Ventures and the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act
In response to industry concerns during the early 1980s that
aggressive antitrust enforcement could chill productive joint research
ventures,206 Congress enacted the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act, or the NCRPA.207 The NCRPA limits potential
antitrust liability for horizontal arrangements among competitors that
qualify as “joint ventures.”208 It also establishes that such
collaborations “shall not be deemed illegal, per se,” but will be
assessed using a “reasonableness” standard.209
For purposes of the NCRPA, a “joint venture” constitutes any
group of activities undertaken by two or more parties for the purpose
of
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study
of phenomena or observable facts, (B) the development or
testing of basic engineering techniques, (C) the extension of
investigative findings or theory of a scientific or technical
nature into practical application for experimental and
demonstration purposes, including the experimental production
24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-immunities [https://perma.cc/KVV2FUSS].
206. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 272. See generally Christopher O.B.
Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Antitrust Regime for Joint
Research and Development Ventures, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 133 (1986) (discussing the
adoption of the NCRPA and the conditions that lead to its adoption). This period in
American history was characterized by excessive concern over the competitiveness of
American industry in the face of increasing foreign (particularly Japanese) competition.
Id. at 139. In addition to the NCRPA, it gave rise to the Patent and Trademark Law
Amendments Act, more commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200 to 211 (2012)), which enabled
universities and other federally-funded researchers to obtain patent protection for their
discoveries. See supra note 13 (describing collaborations such as Sematech as a response to
similar concerns).
207. National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107
Stat. 119 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2012)) (amending the
1984 act to add production to the list of protected activities and yielding the commonlyused acronym “NCRPA”). The Act was further amended in 2004 to add “standards
development activity” to the activities covered by the Act. Development Organization
Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237, sec. 103(1), § 4301(a)(7), 118 Stat. 661, 663
(2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(7) (2012)).
208. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303, 4305 (2012) (conveying that if a horizontal agreement qualifies
as a joint venture under the NCRPA, the venturers may provide notice to the attorney
general and the FTC informing them of the joint venture and its membership, and
thereafter, any antitrust suit brought against the joint venture will be limited to recovery
of actual damages and attorney’s fees, rather than the treble damages otherwise available
under section 15 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012)).
209. Id. § 4302.
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and testing of models, prototypes, equipment, materials, and
processes, (D) the production of a product, process, or service,
(E) the testing in connection with the production of a product,
process, or service by such venture, (F) the collection,
exchange, and analysis of research or production information,
or (G) any combination of the purposes specified in
subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F), and may include
the establishment and operation of facilities for the conducting
of such venture, the conducting of such venture on a protected
and proprietary basis, and the prosecuting of applications for
patents and the granting of licenses for the results of such
venture.210
As noted above, the NCRPA ensures that the collaborative
activities of joint ventures will be analyzed under the rule of reason.
In some instances, even behavior that would normally be condemned
as illegal per se may be permissible when conducted by a joint
venture. Thus, under the NCRPA, activities including the following
may be permitted if they are found to be “reasonably required to
carry out the purpose” of a joint venture: exchanging information
relating to costs, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution
of any product, process, or service; restricting or requiring the sale,
licensing, or sharing of inventions, developments, products, processes,
or services not developed through, or produced by, the venture;
restricting or requiring participation by any party to the venture in
other R&D activities; allocating markets; or restricting, requiring, or
otherwise affecting the production of a product, process, or service.211
2. Rule of Reason Analysis for Collaborative R&D Arrangements
Collaborative R&D agreements, both under the Sherman Act
and the NCRPA, are subject to rule of reason analysis in which
potential anticompetitive harms are weighed against procompetitive
benefits. While the analysis of these arrangements falls within the
general contours of the antitrust rule of reason analysis set forth in
Section II.A above, there are a number of special considerations that
arise specifically in the context of collaborative R&D agreements. It
is the rule of reason, as informed by the special considerations
discussed below, which provides the foundation for the framework
that we discuss in Part III.

210. Id. § 4301(a)(6).
211. Id. § 4301(b)(1), (b)(3)(A)–(B), (b)(5)–(8).
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Consolidation of Research Operations

Collaborative R&D arrangements, by their nature, enable
multiple parties to combine or forgo individual R&D activities in the
areas addressed by the collaboration. While such consolidation may
achieve efficiencies of scale, combine technical skill to foster
increased innovation, and eliminate barriers imposed by blocking
intellectual property, the combination of formerly competitive R&D
programs may also pose risks of anticompetitive harm.
Combining the R&D activities of several competitors, for
example, is likely to reduce the number of independent lines of
inquiry pursued by the members of the group.212 While such a
reduction may eliminate inefficient or unpromising lines of research,
it is also possible that one of the eliminated lines may have yielded
the best results. Such combinations may thus lead to lower overall
levels of innovation and new product development. Eliminating R&D
competition among collaborators may also reduce incentives to
improve product quality, to get new and improved products to market
quickly, and to offer superior customer service.
These risks are endemic to R&D collaborations, even those with
the best intentions. The risks are higher when there is a possibility
that participants in an R&D collaboration may intentionally collude
to reduce competition. Participants in a collaboration may, for
example, agree not to innovate in ways that threaten one another’s
markets or products.213
From the agencies’ perspectives, one central question in
evaluating an R&D collaboration is whether it is likely to reduce the
parties’ incentive or ability to engage in independent R&D,
presumably in competition with, or complementary to, that of the
collaboration.214 Anticompetitive effects are more likely to be found
when a collaborative R&D activity has the potential to reduce the
parties’ profits in other lines of business (e.g., by rendering an existing
product line obsolete), “or when a regulatory approval process limits
the ability of late-comers to catch up with competitors already
engaged in the R&D.”215

212.
213.
214.
215.

COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.31(a), at 15.
13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 2100e, at 14.
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.31(a), at 15.
See id.
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Exchange of Competitive Information

As noted in Section II.A, the exchange of information among
competitors can lead to collusion and generally gives rise to antitrust
concerns. In R&D collaborations, of course, the exchange of
information is often essential to achieve the benefits of the
collaboration.216 The agencies have recognized that sharing of
information regarding technology, know how, best practices, and
intellectual property by the parties to an R&D collaboration may be
necessary to implement the collaborative research program and may
thus be procompetitive.217 Nevertheless, if the shared information
includes information related to marketing, product plans, or pricing,
collusion and other anticompetitive effects may be found.218
c.

Overall Competitive Effect and Procompetitive Benefits

If a collaboration agreement is likely to have anticompetitive
effects, the next step in the rule of reason analysis is to determine the
overall competitive effect of the agreement. This inquiry focuses on
whether any identifiable efficiency gains stemming from the
agreement would be enough to offset the agreement’s anticompetitive
effects.219
As noted above, numerous procompetitive benefits may arise
from collaboration agreements. These include spreading the financial
burden of costly research, combining technical skill and knowledge to
achieve synergies and promote innovation, enabling the parties to
engage in research that they might not have been able to conduct
individually, combining intellectual property to avoid blocking
positions, accelerating the development of new products, and
lowering research and production costs through economies of scale.220
As noted by one agency official, in some cases collaboration may
even result in “product and service offerings that would be
completely unavailable without coordination among otherwise
competitive firms.”221 Thus, even when anticompetitive effects are
theoretically possible, or even likely, the significant procompetitive

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See id. § 3.31(b), at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3.37, at 24–25.
See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 2115a, at 111–12;
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.31(a), at 14; SULLIVAN & GRIMES,
supra note 169, at 729.
221. Varney, supra note 205, at 5.
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benefits that may arise from R&D collaborations could outweigh the
harms under a rule of reason analysis.
3. The Challenges of Market Definition in R&D Collaborations
As with other potentially anticompetitive agreements, R&D
collaborations must be analyzed with respect to their impact on
defined markets.222 There are two types of markets that must be
evaluated in connection with R&D collaborations: (1) the market for
the parties’ and the collaboration’s products and services and (2) the
market for relevant R&D.223 In terms of the pharmaceutical industry,
this distinction has been characterized as competition in the
development of new drugs and competition in the sale of drugs.224
Below, we discuss the definition of both product and R&D markets in
the pharmaceutical industry.
a.

Product Markets

Just as with other agreements among competitors, collaborative
R&D agreements may have an effect on the product or service
markets in which the parties compete. Products relevant to an R&D
collaboration include both the products that the parties to the
collaboration produce and sell individually, and those that the
collaboration will produce and sell.225 For example, Firm A is a
producer of pliable synthetic materials, and Firm B is a producer of
industrial helium. These two firms form a joint venture to develop
and produce high-altitude weather balloons. Both the product
markets for pliable synthetic materials and helium, as well as the
product market for weather balloons, are implicated in the venture.
b.

R&D Markets

Cooperative research agreements may affect not only markets
for products sold by the parties and the collaboration, but the conduct
of R&D itself. This is a so-called “R&D” or “innovation” market.
The existence of a “market” in R&D has been recognized both by the
U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies and in the NCRPA, which

222. See supra Section II.A.
223. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.32, at 16–17. See supra notes 19
and 21 (regarding use of “research and development markets” in place of “innovation
markets”).
224. M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 637 (2003) (“Competition in the pharmaceutical industry occurs on
two levels: the development of new drugs, and the sale of drugs.”).
225. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.32, at 16.
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requires that the competitive effects of a cooperative research
arrangement be evaluated “in properly defined, relevant research,
development, product, process and service markets.”226
As explained by the agencies, an R&D market comprises “the
research and development directed to particular new or improved
goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development.”227 Thus, if a collaboration is likely to impair R&D
relating to future products in a particular field, an R&D market will
be implicated.228
Gilbert and Sunshine highlight the potential economic harms
that may flow from reductions in innovation and the impairment of
R&D markets with respect to the parties to a potential merger:
A reduction in innovation may delay improvements in
production processes that would lower the production costs of
each of the merging firms, or it may reduce the magnitude of
such improvements. In addition, a reduction in innovation may
reduce the likelihood of discovery or delay the introduction by
each firm of new or improved products. The loss of production
improvements would result in higher costs, and possibly higher
prices, even in markets where only one of the merging firms is a
participant. Similarly, the loss of new or improved products
would deny consumers the benefits of these improvements in
every market where the firm is a supplier, including markets
where only one of the firms is a participant.229

226. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2012). See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Antitrust Regulation of Innovation Markets, Remarks at ABA Antitrust Intellectual
Property Conference 4–9 (Feb. 5, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/public_statements/antitrust-regulation-innovation-markets/090205innovationspeech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7M5P-NQEZ] (offering a brief history of FTC regulation of competition
in innovation markets, beginning with a challenge to a proposed Xerox Corporation
merger in 1974).
227. IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.2.3, at 11. The IP Licensing
Guidelines Proposed Update define R&D markets as consisting of “the assets comprising
research and development related to the identification of a commercializable product, or
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for
that research and development.” IP LICENSING GUIDELINES PROPOSED UPDATE, supra
note 19, § 3.2.3, at 16.
228. See COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.32(c), at 17 (noting “if a
competitor collaboration may have competitive effects on innovation that cannot be
adequately addressed through the analysis of goods or technology markets, the Agencies
may define and analyze an innovation market”).
229. Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 570
(1995).
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Notwithstanding the theoretical existence of R&D markets,
identifying and defining these markets in practice has proven
challenging.230 This is an evolving area of law, with disagreement even
among antitrust regulators about the appropriate role of antitrust
laws in regulating R&D markets231 and divergent views regarding the
market conditions that best foster innovation.232 A recent update to
the IP Licensing Guidelines attempts to clarify the definition of R&D
markets, but ultimately does little more than change the terminology
and provide for more flexibility in analyzing intellectual property
arrangements that impact R&D markets.233
As with product markets, agencies seek to define R&D markets
by reference to “close substitutes.”234 That is, an R&D market will
include all R&D efforts of similar nature, scope, and magnitude, with
access to financial resources, necessary intellectual property, and
skilled personnel, and which have the ability to successfully
commercialize innovations.235
To date, most of the controversies involving the definition of
R&D (or innovation) markets have arisen in the context of proposed
mergers challenged by the agencies. For example, in 1993, the DOJ
challenged the proposed acquisition of General Motors’ transmission
division by ZF Friedrichshafen, a German transmission
manufacturer.236 Though the transmission businesses of GM and ZF
overlapped in only a few specific vehicle markets, the DOJ expressed
concern that ZF would reduce its overall transmission R&D efforts
after the acquisition, thereby dampening “worldwide technological
innovation in the design, development, and production
of . . . automatic transmissions” for a range of vehicles.237

230. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 729 (“Both the market definition
and the harm-benefit issues [with innovation markets] may be imponderable.”).
231. See Rosch, supra note 226, at 2–3.
232. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the SchumpeterArrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2008)
(discussing various “factors that determine the ideal market structure for innovation in
specific industries”).
233. See, e.g., Frederick R. Juckniess, Four Key Changes to Antitrust Guidelines for
Licensing of Intellectual Property—DOJ, FTC Invite Comment, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 9,
2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/four-key-changes-to-antitrust-guidelineslicensing-intellectual-property-doj-ftc [https://perma.cc/E2GX-YC28].
234. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 4.3, at 27.
235. Id.
236. Complaint, United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 93-530, 1993 WL 13610315, at
*1 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 1993).
237. Id. The acquisition was abandoned by the parties following the DOJ’s challenge.
See Rosch, supra note 226, at 6–7.

95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016)

110

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

Once an R&D market is defined, as in the analysis of product
and geographic markets, the competitive impact of the proposed
agreement on that market must be determined.238 If the parties to the
agreement collectively control only a small share of the R&D market,
then anticompetitive harm will be deemed to be unlikely.239 In
general, the agencies will not challenge a competitor collaboration in
an R&D market if there are at least three or more independent
entities outside the collaboration with the incentive or ability to
engage in R&D that is the same or a close substitute.240 On the other
hand, if the parties control a large share of the market or hold
blocking intellectual property positions, then anticompetitive harm is
likely to be found.241
4. Exclusion
As noted in Section II.A, group boycotts are generally deemed
to be illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. A group
boycott constitutes a concerted refusal by a group of competitors to
deal with one or more firms for the purpose of suppressing or
restricting competition.242 These arrangements frequently cut off the
boycotted firms’ access to a supply, facility, or market necessary for it
to compete.243
As with other horizontal arrangements, boycott and exclusion
issues can arise in the context of collaborative research agreements
and joint ventures. These issues can arise both with respect to the
refusal to admit a new member to a venture and the expulsion of an
existing member from the venture.244 Of course, the goal of
commercial research is, by definition, to benefit the parties
conducting the research and disadvantage their competitors.
238. Note that while the IP Licensing Guidelines and the Collaboration Guidelines
focus first on defining an R&D (or innovation) market and then on how competition in
that market is impacted, the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update adopts a more
flexible approach in which the general focus is on anticompetitive effects in R&D and
related technology and goods markets. Compare IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note
19, at 14–15, with IP LICENSING GUIDELINES PROPOSED UPDATE, supra note 19, at 14–
15.
239. See COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 4.2, at 26 (“Agencies do not
challenge a competitor collaboration when the market shares of the collaboration and its
participants collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market
in which competition may be affected.”).
240. Id. § 4.3, at 26–27.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211–13 (1959).
243. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
294 (1985).
244. See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 2214, at 340–44.
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Nevertheless, antitrust issues can arise if the collaborating firms
possess market power and systematically exclude smaller rivals from
both participating in the collaboration and accessing its output.245 This
is particularly true if the output of the collaboration is likely to be of
significant competitive value (e.g., reducing production costs or
improving product quality).246
In many cases, however, the parties to an R&D collaboration
have no obligation to admit others to their venture, and their refusal
to do so does not violate the antitrust laws. For example, there are
numerous legitimate reasons for limiting membership in a joint
venture to a defined number of participants: the purpose of the
venture, the ability to govern and administer it in a rational manner,
the complementarity of skills and experience possessed by the
existing members, and the expectation that members will contribute
necessary assets or intellectual property to the venture.247 In general,
if a refusal to deal is ancillary to a venture’s legitimate goals (e.g.,
reducing costs, improving product quality, or expanding markets), it
will not raise antitrust concerns under an application of the rule of
reason.248 Nevertheless, exclusion or expulsion of a party from a
venture for reasons that are designed to facilitate price fixing, market
allocation, or other illegal activities will likely be considered illegal.249
Out of the detailed analysis of the antitrust framework provided
above we can extract a more specific framework pertinent to precompetitive
collaborations.
Biopharma
pre-competitive
collaborations will, unless they are simply fronts for covert illegal
activity, are analyzed under a rule of reason framework that includes
the analysis of factors such as consolidation of research operations
and exchange of competitive information and pays attention to both
markets for products and services and markets for relevant R&D.
Antitrust authorities have responded to concerns about R&D
245. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 275.
246. See id.
247. See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶ 2214, at 336–44 (citing
examples of joint ventures not violating antitrust laws, including GM and Toyota
operating a single manufacturing plant in California and being able to refuse to admit
others to their arrangement as well as professional sports leagues such as the NFL having
the right to limit league membership and to expel teams for various reasons); id. ¶ 2214c,
at 340 (discussing application of rule of reason to both exclusion and expulsion cases).
248. Id. ¶ 2210b, at 311–13.
249. See id. ¶ 2210b, at 312. In addition, collaborative arrangements that are, by their
terms, designed to have “open” membership policies may risk greater antitrust liability
when excluding or expelling members. See id. ¶ 2220, at 361. These arrangements often
arise in the context of technical standard setting, but are not common in the realm of
biopharma R&D collaborations.
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markets primarily in the context of mergers,250 with less attention to
the impact of R&D collaborations on innovation. Part III discusses
adapting the existing framework for collaborations among
competitors to pre-competitive collaborations and extending analysis
of R&D markets beyond the merger context. We then provide
hypotheticals that demonstrate its application and from this generate
some
suggested
antitrust
guidelines
for
pre-competitive
collaborations.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK TO
BIOPHARMA PRE-COMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS
This Part adapts the antitrust analysis discussed in Part II to precompetitive collaborations in the biopharma industry. It then applies
this analysis to hypothetical examples of pre-competitive
collaborations, illustrating the potential disconnect between industry
understandings and uses of pre-competitive to signal procompetitive
collaborations and the actual analysis conducted by courts and
agencies to determine whether collaborations among competitors are
procompetitive or anticompetitive. This Part goes on to identify
measures that may reduce antitrust concerns in such collaborations,
including active engagement by governmental agencies, public
dissemination of data, and the limitation of intellectual property
encumbrances on resulting innovations. It concludes with suggestions
for a refocusing of strategies away from efforts to characterize
collaborations as pre-competitive and towards a reasoned analysis of
where and how collaborations among competitors can satisfy both
innovation and competition policy goals.
A. Analytical Framework for Pre-Competitive Collaborations
A violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits any
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade”
requires the existence of concerted action among two or more firms
that is unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions and the
presence of market power on the part of the actors.251 The act covers
both horizontal and vertical arrangements. Pre-competitive
collaborations in the biopharma industry encompass both horizontal
arrangements (e.g., among groups of pharmaceutical manufacturers)

250. For a detailed discussion of the ways in which antitrust authorities have evaluated
R&D, or innovation, markets in the pharmaceutical industry, see generally Carrier, supra
note 232.
251. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). See supra Section II.A.
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and vertical arrangements (e.g., among research institutions,
biotechnology firms, and pharmaceutical manufacturers), making an
analysis of both horizontal and vertical agreements necessary. The
antitrust inquiry for these arrangements will turn upon both the
impact on competitive conditions and assessments of market power.
The first step in the antitrust analysis of a pre-competitive
collaboration is determining whether the arrangement should be
deemed illegal per se or examined under a rule of reason analysis.
The types of collaborative R&D arrangements that would be
considered in the biopharma industry to be pre-competitive are
unlikely to trigger concerns of illegality per se and will almost
certainly be analyzed under the rule of reason.252 The DOJ’s antitrust
guidelines for collaborations among competitors explicitly recognize
that many such collaborations “are not only benign but
procompetitive”253 and should generally be analyzed under the rule of
reason.254 These guidelines speak particularly favorably of R&D
collaborations, observing that “[m]ost such agreements are
procompetitive.”255 Antitrust authorities have been tolerant of
collaborations among competitors in a variety of contexts, including
collaborative standard setting and the formation of patent pools,
suggesting a willingness to look carefully at the efficiency gains that
such arrangements among competitors may provide.256 Moreover,
most biopharma pre-competitive collaborations should satisfy the
requirements of the NCRPA, as discussed in Section II.B.1, enabling
them to avail themselves of certain protections to ensure that the
activities of the collaboration will be subject to a rule of reason
approach.
The next step is to apply a rule of reason analysis that is
informed both by the special considerations used by agencies to
evaluate R&D collaborations among competitors and by factors that
252. These collaborative R&D arrangements can be contrasted with reverse payment
agreements between pioneer firms and possible generic entrants. But even with these
agreements, which have a direct bearing on price and entry, concerns about innovation
and market structure make the analysis more complex than a illegal per se approach
would allow. For a discussion of antitrust concerns in reverse payment agreements, see
Michael Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 40, 67 (2009) (discussing the importance in antitrust
analysis of a regulatory regime that addresses the challenged activity and argues for
treating reverse-payment agreements as presumptively illegal as a way of supporting
competition goals in the applicable regulatory regime).
253. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 1.
254. See id. § 1.2, at 3.
255. Id. § 3.31(a), at 14.
256. See Rosch, supra note 226, at 10.
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are specific to biopharma R&D. While the standard factors guiding a
rule of reason analysis—including intent of the parties, limitations on
independence and competition, nature and extent of exchange of
information, duration, markets and market power, and offsetting
procompetitive benefits—are applicable, antitrust authorities
recognize the special nature and needs of R&D intensive markets and
will tailor their analysis accordingly.257 After determining the relevant
market(s), the analysis should focus on the effects of the collaboration
on consolidation of research operations in the relevant market(s), the
likelihood of exchange of competitive information, and the balancing
of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive benefits of the
proposed arrangement.258 The inevitable consolidation of at least
some R&D activities and the widespread sharing of information that
takes place within most pre-competitive collaborations should be
evaluated in terms of its impact on competition, taking potential
entrants and the magnitude of offsetting efficiency benefits into
account.
In determining whether a pre-competitive collaboration is
procompetitive, courts will consider both the market for the parties’
and the collaboration’s products and services, and the impact on the
market for relevant R&D. In the pharmaceutical industry this
distinction has been characterized as competition in the development
of new drugs and competition in the sale of drugs.259
Product markets relevant to an R&D collaboration include both
the products that the parties to the collaboration produce and sell
individually, and those that the collaboration will produce and sell
collectively. Thus, if parties A and B form a collaboration to develop
a new type of influenza vaccine, and A agrees as part of the
collaboration to limit sales of an existing prescription analgesic, which
competes with B’s over-the-counter analgesic, then both the influenza
vaccine market (the collaboration’s product) as well as the analgesic
market (the parties’ independent products) would be implicated.
Product markets in the pharmaceutical industry have been
defined according to a variety of criteria, both by courts and agencies.
According to one 2003 survey, the FTC has defined pharmaceutical
markets in merger and other cases based on some combination of the
following factors:

257. See id.
258. See supra Section II.B.2.
259. Morse, supra note 224, at 637.
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(1) whether drugs treat the same disease, condition, or
indication;260 (2) whether drugs treat a disease by interacting
with the body in the same manner (i.e., whether they have the
same “mechanism of action”); (3) whether drugs have the same
specific chemical compounds; (4) whether drugs have the same
dosage form such as injectable, liquid, capsule, tablets, or
topical; (5) whether drugs have the same frequency of dosage,
such as once-a-day or extended release; (6) whether drugs have
the same strength of dosage, distinguishing, for example, 30mg
and 60mg tablets; (7) whether drugs are branded or generic; (8)
whether drugs require a prescription or are sold over-thecounter; and (9) whether drugs are currently marketed or are in
development.261
The biggest, although not the only, antitrust concern for most
pre-competitive collaborations will be their likely impact on R&D
markets. R&D markets are particularly important in the
pharmaceutical industry. As one commentator recently observed,
[P]harmaceuticals is an industry that doesn’t lend itself to
traditional market analysis. Because the bulk of profits in the
industry come from temporary monopolies—the governmentgranted patents—the current marketplace is not where the
important competition takes place. Rather, the real rivalry
takes place “upstream,” as companies compete to innovate,
either by developing medicines in their labs or by buying up
promising patents and biotech start-ups.262
Consistent with this observation, almost all recent agency
challenges raising concerns about effects on R&D markets have
arisen in the biopharma sector.263 One such challenge, and a good
example of potential antitrust concern arising from arguably precompetitive activity, was the FTC’s 1996 intervention in the proposed
merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz.264 At the time of the merger, each
of the parties held U.S. patents critical to the development of then260. This criterion is often referred to as “therapeutic class,” a 5-digit Uniform System
of Classification (“USC”) for pharmaceutical products utilized widely throughout North
America. The Uniform System of Classification (USC), IMS HEALTH, https://www
.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%20Institute/USC_Classiification_Process_2011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H23J-B4MR]. For examples of market definition using therapeutic class, see
Market Definition in Antitrust, supra note 19, at 316–17.
261. Morse, supra note 224, at 643–44.
262. Steven Perlstein, Not What the Doctor Ordered, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2009), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/01/27/ST2009012703641.html [http://
perma.cc/W3SG-E424].
263. See Market Definition in Antitrust, supra note 19, at 487.
264. In re Ciba-Giegy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997).
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nascent gene therapy technology.265 Since the FDA had not yet
approved any gene therapy products, no market existed for gene
therapy products.266 Prior to the proposed merger, Ciba-Geigy and
Sandoz competed to innovate in this emerging field.267
Notwithstanding the pre-competitive state of the gene therapy field,
the FTC was concerned that the combined firm, Novartis, might
refuse to license its foundational gene therapy patents to others; the
result would have constrained competition in the gene therapy R&D
market and limited the future market for gene therapy products.268 In
response to these concerns, the parties entered into a consent decree
with the FTC, settling the dispute.269 Under the decree Novartis
agreed to license its gene therapy patents to Rhone Poulenc, one of
its principal competitors, thereby preserving at least some
competition in the market for gene therapy innovation.270
Once an R&D market is defined, the competitive impact of the
proposed agreement on that market must be determined. If the
parties to the agreement collectively control only a small share of the
R&D market, then anticompetitive harm will be deemed unlikely.271
In general, the agencies will not challenge a competitor collaboration
in an R&D market if there are three or more independent entities
outside the collaboration with the incentive or ability to engage in
R&D that is the same or a close substitute.272 On the other hand, if
the parties control a large share of the market or hold blocking
intellectual property positions, as they did in the Ciba-Geigy merger,
then anticompetitive harm is likely to be found.273 Given the high
level of concentration in the industry and the specialized nature of
drug discovery and development, many of the pre-competitive
collaborations will involve collaboration among most, if not all, of the
firms with the ability and incentive to pursue a particular drug. This
safe harbor-based approach is therefore unlikely to have much effect
when evaluating pre-competitive collaborations in the biopharma
industry.

265. Id. at 846–47.
266. Id. at 845.
267. Id. at 851.
268. In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., F.T.C. Docket No. C-3725, Analysis of Proposed Consent
Order to Aid Public Comment at 6 (Dec. 17, 1996).
269. Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 853.
270. Id. at 873–77.
271. See COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 4.2, at 26.
272. Id. § 4.3, at 26–27.
273. Id.; Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 873–77.
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Pre-competitive collaborations in this industry create some
unique challenges for a rule of reason analysis. Many of the
collaborations will involve consolidation of some aspects of the R&D
process, including shared clinical trials and shared information about
possible targets for drug development. Indeed, they are sometimes
designed specifically to consolidate R&D capabilities of leading
competitors in order to reduce the cost of maintaining competing
drug programs. Given the high costs, risks, and uncertainty in drug
discovery and development, it may sometimes be efficient to allow
combined research efforts to replace competitive individual efforts.
But this assessment is difficult to make and requires guessing about
the best way to achieve pharmaceutical innovation.
The collaborations will also likely involve the exchange of
information that may once have been treated by industry members as
proprietary, although the information is now characterized as precompetitive. The boundary between information that is, or is not,
product specific or competitive in nature and information becomes
difficult to draw. Moreover, the exchange of information that impacts
product decisions may be essential to achieve a collaboration’s hopedfor benefits. While most pre-competitive collaborations currently
involve sharing of technology, know how, intellectual property, and
best practices, there is pressure to expand the realm of data sharing
into areas which are more closely linked to downstream product
development choices. While antitrust concerns would be raised where
the shared information related to drug product plans or pricing, it is
unclear how the boundary between general information about a
disease and potential pathways for addressing the disease and specific
information about a potential drug should be drawn in practice.
Finally, the highly regulated nature of the industry adds to the
complexity of analyzing how pre-competitive collaborations will
impact competition. The determination of market power may become
complicated by the fact that the market works to some degree by
allowing for limited periods of market power, via patent rights and
data exclusivity, as mechanisms for encouraging the extensive
investment needed to develop and sell medical therapies. The market
thus relies to some extent on the creation of market power as an
innovation strategy.
B.

Hypothetical Examples and Application of Framework

The following hypothetical examples illustrate pre-competitive
collaborations at various stages during the drug discovery and
development cycle. Each example highlights different aspects of the
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disconnect
between
assumptions
about
pre-competitive
collaborations and antitrust concerns regarding whether
collaborations are procompetitive or anticompetitive. The first
example applies the framework that the agencies would use to
evaluate whether a collaboration raises antitrust concerns.274 The
subsequent examples illustrate some of the different concerns that
may arise in alternative types of collaborative arrangements.
Example 1: Pre-Competitive Does Not Always Mean Procompetitive
Six pharmaceutical firms that collectively account for more than
ninety percent of private U.S. R&D spending on Parkinson’s disease
enter into a ten-year collaboration agreement. There are no effective
treatments for Parkinson’s disease on the market. Before the
collaboration, each member pursued independent and proprietary
research designed to identify and validate biomarkers useful in
measuring the progression of Parkinson’s disease and the effects of
experimental treatments on the progression of the disease. During the
collaboration they will pursue joint research studies and clinical trials
to identify and validate biomarkers for Parkinson’s disease. They
form a separate organization that they will jointly control in order to
collect and manage tissue samples and data generated by their jointly
conducted studies and clinical trials. They will share the results of
their joint studies and clinical trials with the public on a no-cost basis
through a project portal they collectively fund and control.
Discussion: In this example, the collaboration involves sharing
information and capabilities relating to the design of new drugs to
diagnose and treat Parkinson’s disease. Although there is no current
product market, the relevant antitrust inquiry involves a
determination of the nature and likely impact on an R&D market.275
In conducting this analysis, the first step considers the relevant R&D
market, then identifies which entities are actual or likely potential
competitors of the collaboration. As discussed in Part II, an R&D
market “consists of the research and development directed to
particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close
substitutes for that research and development.”276 Thus, the R&D
market in question could be broadly defined as the market for

274. See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.2.3, at 10–11.
275. For a discussion of the FTC’s investigation of the proposed Ciba-Geigy merger
with Sandoz, involving the nascent market for gene therapy products, see supra notes 264–
70 and accompanying text.
276. IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 3.2.3, at 11.
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developing new diagnostics and drugs for Parkinson’s disease or, even
more broadly, for Parkinson’s disease and other related neuromotor
disorders.
Once the relevant R&D market is defined, the analysis requires
assessing whether the collaboration is likely to have anticompetitive
effects in the defined market. In undertaking this analysis, attention
must be given both to the potential effects on competition between
the collaboration and non-participants and competition among the
participants. Relevant factors in both of these areas are the degree of
concentration in the market, the market share of the collaboration
participants, and the presence of independent entities with
comparable capabilities and incentives to engage in comparable
R&D.
When considering competition between the collaboration and
others, market concentration must be assessed. Where there are at
least four independent entities with comparable capabilities and
incentives to conduct R&D efforts that are close substitutes for the
R&D to be conducted by the collaboration, the collaboration will
ordinarily be found not to adversely impact competition in the
specified market. In this example, most of the firms currently engaged
in Parkinson’s research will be part of the collaboration, arguably
limiting independent competition in this research area. However, the
analysis must also consider the likelihood that other pharmaceutical
firms will enter this R&D market to compete with the collaboration.
The likelihood of independent market entry will depend on factors
including the ability of the collaboration to block independent entry
by using patents or other intellectual property barriers. In this
example, if the collaborators possess key patents relating to the
treatment of Parkinson’s disease, then antitrust concerns may arise, as
they did in In re Ciba-Geigy Limited.277
Attention must also be paid to the potential effect of the
collaboration on the independent R&D efforts of the collaborators,
and whether the collaboration is likely to incentivize the participants
to reduce investment in or diminish the speed or scope of their
independent R&D efforts. Given that the likely goals of the
collaboration are to eliminate duplicative R&D activity, achieve
economies of scale, and consolidate all Parkinson’s-related R&D in
the collaboration, participants will likely reduce their independent
R&D efforts.

277. See supra notes 264–70 and accompanying text.
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Given these potential competition-reducing effects, the
collaboration will likely be found to create a significant risk of
anticompetitive harm in the defined R&D market. In applying rule of
reason analysis, these risks must then be weighed against the potential
procompetitive benefits arising from the collaboration. Examples of
such benefits might include the potential for combining
complementary assets and resources to produce an innovation
outcome faster, at lower cost, and/or to increase the likelihood of a
successful outcome. In this example the collaboration is being formed
to share costs and risks at early stages of product development in
order to improve the likelihood of success of each individual
participant in its own product development activities at later stages of
product development.
While these procompetitive benefits may result in the
collaboration passing antitrust muster, this result is not guaranteed.
Thus, careful attention must be paid to the terms of the collaboration
agreement, and measures should be taken to ensure that the
agreement’s procompetitive benefits outweigh its potential
anticompetitive harm. For example, the collaborators may consider
offering to license blocking patents on Parkinson’s research to other
market participants.278 The most important lesson from this example
is that even early-stage collaborations directed toward R&D in precompetitive markets may result in anticompetitive effects. Ultimately
the fact that a collaboration is pre-competitive does not ensure that it
will be deemed to be procompetitive.
Example 2: Early Stage Does Not Always Mean Pre-Competitive
Three leading biotechnology firms, together accounting for
seventy-five percent of the current industry spending on investment in
developing a biologic treatment for a rare but deadly form of lung
cancer, enter into a collaboration agreement. They agree to share all
research data that they have previously acquired from their own
clinical trials conducted using drug candidates that were ultimately
not approved due to poor efficacy.279 They also commit to sharing
samples and conducting joint studies to narrow the most promising
278. See supra notes 268–73 and accompanying text.
279. Though the public disclosure of summary clinical trials data on NIH’s
ClinicalTrials.gov website is required by law, the vast majority of clinical trials data
remains private. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904–22 (2007) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)
(2012)). See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 17 (outlining
guiding principles and a framework for the responsible sharing of clinical trial data).
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approach to find treatments for the disease. They will not make the
results of their collaboration public. There are two other smaller firms
in the industry pursuing R&D programs for the same rare form of
lung cancer. These firms have not been included in the collaboration.
There are currently no approved drugs on the market to treat this
form of lung cancer and none of the participating firms have active
clinical trials, but they all have potential drug candidates that they are
in the early stages of researching.
Discussion: In this example, as in the previous one, the
collaboration involves sharing information and capabilities that relate
to the design of new, currently non-existent, products, and the
relevant inquiry will focus on determining the nature and likely
impact on an R&D market. Here, the products are biological
treatments for a particular form of lung cancer. There are four
important differences between this example and the prior one,
however: (1) the exclusion of competitors from the collaboration;
(2) the failure to share the collaboration data and results with
competitors or more broadly with the public; (3) the focus on
achieving cost savings by sharing proprietary data and limiting
research paths rather than on collaborating to produce new results;
and (4) the absence of a separate governance structure to separate
collaborative and competitive activities. These differences create
strong antitrust concerns that are not meaningfully mitigated by the
pre-competitive nature of the collaboration.
As in the previous example, the antitrust analysis will focus on
the nature and likely impact of the agreement on an R&D market,
which could be broadly defined as the market for developing new
treatments for this specific form of lung cancer or for this and a
related class of cancers. The next step is to determine whether the
collaboration is likely to have anticompetitive effects in the defined
market, including any impact on competition among the participants
and competition with non-participants. This collaboration raises
concerns about both types of competition. First, it may reduce the
number of R&D paths being pursued by the participants—indeed,
this is one of the intended goals. Participants are sharing proprietary
clinical trial data with each other and are committing to joint studies
to narrow the development paths that they will pursue. Second, the
collaboration may have negative effects on competition with nonparticipants. The collaboration includes the three largest firms and
excludes two smaller competitors. Although the presence of these two
competitors may reduce competition concerns by preserving
independent R&D paths, the concentration of resources caused by
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this collaboration may leave the existing competitors at a
disadvantage. If the collaboration negatively impacts these
competitors, they may have difficulty staying in the market, and
potential entry may be deterred.
Third, the nature of the arrangement seems to be primarily
focused on achieving cost savings from consolidating research efforts
and avoiding duplicate clinical trials rather than on encouraging more
and faster innovation. The collaborators are sharing previously
generated data with each other rather than focusing on future jointly
generated data, and they are committing to joint studies that may
limit the number of R&D paths that they pursue. Private cost savings
are not regarded as sufficient procompetitive justification for an
otherwise anticompetitive arrangement.
Finally, the structure of the collaboration does not include
protections that might limit the sharing of competitive information
across firms. There is no independent governance structure for the
collaboration that could serve to separate the joint R&D efforts from
competitive product development activities.
In this example the collaboration is justified largely on efficiency
grounds. It eliminates duplication and waste, may make developing a
drug more cost effective and may accelerate discovery of an effective
treatment. But rather than pooling efforts to generate new ideas, this
hypothetical involves sharing proprietary information to reduce the
number of paths being pursued. This may well increase efficiency, but
is this collaboration the least restrictive way of achieving these
efficiency benefits? Are the restrictions imposed on entry and data
sharing reasonably necessary to achieve these benefits? This
collaboration would likely cause antitrust concern.
Even more than the previous example, this example shows that
early-stage collaborations directed toward R&D in pre-competitive
markets may result in anticompetitive effects.
Example 3: Late Stage Collaborations May Not Be Pre-Competitive,
But May Nonetheless Be Procompetitive
Two of the pharmaceutical industry’s largest firms, A and B,
have approved therapies on the market to treat a new and widespread
strain of influenza (strain HxNy), representing fifty-five percent of
the total market. Comparable products are marketed by three other
firms. The market leader, Firm C, has the only influenza drug
approved for use in children and also accounts for thirty-five percent
of the adult market. A and B wish to form a collaboration to combine
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their influenza HxNy R&D efforts to develop a safe and effective
treatment for influenza HxNy in children. In the past, A and B have
each individually approached C regarding the cross-licensing of
patents and data that C holds relating to its influenza HxNy products,
but C is not willing to entertain licensing discussions.
The collaboration will be conducted through a new joint venture
entity (“JV”) in which A and B will each hold a fifty percent share.
JV will own all intellectual property arising from the collaboration
and will manufacture and market any new product that is developed.
As part of the collaboration, A and B will share research data that
they formerly treated as confidential and will exclusively license their
influenza-related patents to JV. A and B each agree that they will not
admit any other pharmaceutical manufacturer into JV or share data
or results with any other firm unless both parties and JV agree to do
so.
Discussion: This example involves current product markets.
Though A and B collectively control fifty-five percent of the total
influenza HxNy therapy market, their collaboration will focus on
juvenile influenza treatments. In the market for juvenile influenza
HxNy treatments, Firm C controls one hundred percent of the
market, and both A and B have zero percent. They wish to combine
resources in order to compete more effectively with C, which
currently enjoys a natural monopoly in this area and has proven
unwilling to assist market entry through patent licensing. As such, the
collaboration of A and B is unlikely to have adverse effects on
competition and instead is likely to result in new products that
increase competition in this market and thereby improve consumer
choice, reduce prices, and improve quality. Moreover, due to the low
market share currently held by A and B in the affected market, the
agencies are unlikely to investigate or challenge the collaboration
absent some evidence of other illegal activity.280 Given the substantial
outlays that A and B are likely to make with respect to this
collaboration, it is not unreasonable for them to close their venture to
newcomers who have not invested in the project from the outset.281
This example illustrates that a collaboration between
competitors may be procompetitive even if it relates to activity that is
beyond the pre-competitive stage and, more importantly, that

280. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting agencies are unlikely to
challenge a collaboration controlling less than twenty percent of the relevant market).
281. See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion from
collaborations).
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beneficial collaborations should not be avoided simply because they
are perceived not to be pre-competitive.
Example 4: Rules Requiring Immediate Data Disclosure and Limiting
the Ability to Patent May Not Always Be Procompetitive
Six of the pharmaceutical industry’s largest firms, accounting for
sixty-five percent of the private sector R&D efforts to develop
treatments for Alzheimer’s disease, create a collaboration that is open
to all industry stakeholders. Four of these six firms have existing
treatments for Alzheimer’s disease on the market, but these
treatments only reduce the symptoms and or delay the onset of the
disease; they do not prevent or cure it. To make joining the
collaboration attractive, the six firms agree to share all of the data
that they have gathered from past clinical trials on failed Alzheimer’s
drug candidates with other members of the collaboration. They also
agree to share all of the information they have or acquire during the
term of the collaboration that is useful in identifying and validating
novel biomarkers for Alzheimer’s disease. In order to join the
collaboration, participants must agree to a data sharing policy that
includes requirements (a) to share all research results that fall within
the scope of the collaboration with collaboration members and (b) to
grant the other collaborators a royalty-free license to intellectual
property that may encompass the activities of the collaboration. The
results of the collaboration will be shared only with members of the
collaboration that have agreed to these terms. The collaboration has
no specified end date, and may be dissolved only upon an affirmative
vote of all members.
Discussion: The analysis will focus on the effects of this
collaboration on the market for R&D relating to treatments for
Alzheimer’s disease and, perhaps, related dementias. The firms that
have formed the collaboration do not account for all of the market,
but the goal of the collaboration is to encourage entry by all actual
and potential competitors in the R&D market for Alzheimer’s drugs.
This example primarily involves R&D markets, although it may have
product market effects due to the existence of related products owned
by participants. The analysis will turn on a comparison of the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the proposed
arrangement.
This collaboration involves a pooling of resources but may not
result in a consolidation of R&D paths. Indeed, the hope might be
that by sharing some basic inputs needed to identify possible
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products, the result will be to increase the number of R&D paths. At
first glance this would seem like a procompetitive arrangement,
focusing on enlarging the public domain of knowledge in a complex
disease area. The focus is on identifying and validating biomarkers
that will be useful to different firms pursuing different competitive
products. Entry is not restricted, and data and intellectual property
relevant to the collaboration is shared freely with anyone who wants
to join.
But there are also more subtle competition concerns. The
collaboration requires a substantial amount of information sharing
that may include competitive information about project design and
selection. It also involves broad intellectual property sharing
agreements, which is limited to collaboration members. These
requirements could lead to an increase in the concentration of
competitively significant assets among participants. The agreement
may also reflect a plan of strategically forfeiting rights to preempt
competitor intellectual property positions. The requirement will have
a distinct impact on different industry members by making certain
kinds of biological data freely available within the group while
preserving rights over other kinds of data. The presence of this type
of arrangement could limit entry into the market because small firms
cannot get access to the data they need without giving up their own
competitive advantage in the form of proprietary data and intellectual
property rights.
This example illustrates that open participation and a focus on
freely sharing early stage research results, hallmarks of many precompetitive collaborations, do not guarantee that the collaboration
will be procompetitive.
C.

Recommended Practices for Pre-Competitive Research
Collaborations

The above analyses demonstrate that R&D collaborations in the
biopharma industry need to be structured with antitrust concerns in
mind. In this final Section we suggest guidelines for mitigating
antitrust concerns for industry participants seeking to form new R&D
collaborations or to improve existing collaborations. The following
suggestions are derived from the antitrust framework applicable to
such collaborations and reflect areas where competitive concerns
might arise.
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1. Nature and Scope of the Collaboration
Antitrust concerns can arise from both the consolidation of
actual or potentially competitive research operations and the
potential impact of the collaboration on the markets of the
participants in the collaboration.282 The nature and scope of the
collaboration should be designed with both concerns in mind.
Antitrust concerns with the consolidation of R&D capabilities
will be greatest when the collaboration involves a combination of
formerly competitive R&D programs or a merging of the specialized
R&D resources of those firms most likely to engage in developing a
particular product. Whenever possible, collaborations should be
limited to areas in which the participants are not actively competing.
Efforts should be made to compartmentalize the R&D process into
areas in which cooperation is essential to solve a common roadblock
or provide a particular input to the development process at a
reasonable cost. These efforts should not affect areas in which
competition in the R&D process will remain.
One central question in evaluating an R&D collaboration is
whether it is likely to reduce the parties’ incentive or ability to engage
in independent R&D, presumably in competition with or
complementary to that of the collaboration. Care should be taken not
to limit competitive activity outside of the sphere of agreed
cooperation. While cooperation may occur in later stages of product
development, it should not extend into areas where parties are
competing. Rather collaboration should relate to areas that are not
product-specific.
Anticompetitive effects are more likely to be found when a
collaborative R&D activity has the potential to reduce the parties’
profits in other lines of business. For example, when firms are already
selling a drug to treat a disease but seek to discover and develop a
new and better drug, they may not have strong enough incentives to
invest in the potential new drug. Indeed, they may have incentives to
delay the development of new drugs. To alleviate concerns,
collaborations could be limited to areas where pooling of resources
and expertise is necessary to solve a problem or produce results that
are too difficult, risky, and expensive for individual firms to reach
alone; ensuring that these benefits are made widely available to
existing firms and potential entrants may also reduce these concerns.
But collaborations that are targeted in areas that are unlikely to
282. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing rule of reason analysis for R&D
collaborations).
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cannibalize the markets of existing participants will create fewer
antitrust concerns.
It is critical to preserve meaningful independent decision making
authority over product development choices. Limitations on
independent decision making within the collaboration should be
minimal and should be confined to those areas of decision making
that involve the sharing and use of pooled resources.
When considering the scope of the collaboration, it is important
to consider not only the activities covered but also the likely duration
of the collaboration. Unless there is a compelling reason not to,
collaborations should have a limited duration that is justified in terms
of a reasonable timeline for achieving defined goals. Many early precompetitive collaborations were defined around discrete projects with
a time horizon of five years or less.283 Collaborations of ten years or
more might be considered to be mergers, depending on the nature of
the collaboration.284 One of the challenges in evaluating new forms of
collaboration is uncertainty about their impact on innovation.
Limiting the duration of arrangements and encouraging
experimentation with alternative forms will provide important
information about the benefits and costs of these arrangements
before anticompetitive harm develops. Overall, shorter duration is
likely to be regarded more favorably from an antitrust standpoint.
2. Organization and Governance
Pre-competitive collaborations will inevitably involve some
consolidation of R&D programs and product-specific assets. The risks
of this kind of consolidation are higher when there is a possibility that
participants may intentionally collude to reduce competition. The
collaboration should thus be structured and governed with an
emphasis, whenever possible, on openness (both in terms of
participation and in terms of access to results), transparency, and
independence from individual competitive concerns.
283. Based upon a review of the websites of many of the biopharma pre-competitive
collaborations, most are organized into projects or phases with a term of no more than five
years. This includes TSC, one of the earliest examples, as well as the AMP, one of the
most recent examples. See, e.g., Thorisson & Stein, supra note 88, at 124; Accelerating
Medicines Partnership, supra note 139. For a summary of some pre-competitive
collaborations in this space, see ERIC GASTFRIEND & BRYAN LEE, PRECOMPETITIVE
COLLABORATIONS IN PHARMA: AN OVERVIEW STUDY (2015), http://futureoflife.org/
data/documents/PreCompetitiveCollaborationInPharmaIndustry.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FYZ
-6GNP] (summarizing some of the early and current pre-competitive collaborations with
links to project sites).
284. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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Entry and Exit: Unless there are strong reasons for limiting
participation, a collaboration should be open to any industry member
with the relevant expertise and interest. Exclusion of actual or
potential competitors from the collaboration could impair
competition, and any limitation on participation should be justifiable
on efficiency or other legitimate grounds. Anticompetitive effects are
more likely to be found when a regulatory approval process limits the
ability of non-participants or late-comers to catch up with competitors
already engaged in the R&D process, making it even more important
to allow open entry when possible. Sharing the results with the public
quickly and without restriction may offset some of the concerns of
limited entry. Similarly, barriers to exit should be avoided to reduce
the risk that potential competitors are prevented from pursuing their
own projects if and when they deem the collaboration no longer to be
desirable.
Public Sector Participants: Participation in a collaboration by
governmental agencies and other public sector actors may be viewed
favorably from an antitrust perspective. If government actors are
actively engaged in the organization and have some ability to
participate in, or at least review, the decisions that are made by the
leadership of the organization, they will have the ability to monitor
the behavior of competitors. They will also have a greater ability to
ensure that the activities of the collaboration are designed with the
broader public interest in mind.
Independent Leadership: The organization should ideally have
independent leadership and counsel independent of any of the
participants, as well as a clear and transparent system of governance.
There should be a balanced representation of interests on the
governing board to avoid allegations of capture and abuse of voting
processes.285
Legal Documentation: The collaboration should have clear rules
governing the sharing and use of resources and results and should
have an antitrust compliance policy in place.
3. Sharing (and Not Sharing) Information and Results
Rules governing what information and results are to be shared,
as well as rules governing what kinds of information cannot be
shared, are both critical to the collaboration. Antitrust issues can arise
285. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 511 (1988)
(condemning petitioner who packed standards-setting group with voting members who
“shar[ed] their economic interest in restraining competition”).
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when there is an exchange of competitive information among
participants in a collaboration. If the shared information includes
information related to marketing, product plans, or pricing, collusion
and other anticompetitive effects may be found. The collaboration
should thus have strict policies prohibiting the exchange of this kind
of competitive information. This process may require limiting
company personnel who are involved in proprietary activities from
also engaging in areas of shared R&D.
Moving to rules governing what is shared, there are clear benefits
from an antitrust perspective in making the data and intellectual
property generated by a collaboration freely and publicly available
without undue delay. This practice keeps both members and nonmembers of the collaboration on an equal footing when they are
competing in product and R&D markets. Collaborations should
consider requiring the public release of data and rules limiting
intellectual property protection for broad research platform and
research tools, possibly after an exclusive member period if needed to
allow for the opportunity to publish first on research results. To the
extent that rules limiting participants’ ability to obtain intellectual
property protection are not feasible, collaborations should consider
rules that require licensing relevant intellectual property broadly and
non-exclusively if it is critical to R&D markets. An analogy could be
drawn to the fair and reasonable non-discriminatory royalty
requirements that have emerged in standard setting organizations.286
4. Require More Careful Delineation of Procompetitive Benefits
Pre-competitive collaborations are justified most often in terms
of the efficiency gains stemming from the collaboration. But these
justifications are often made without a careful analysis and
comparison of identifiable efficiencies with the actual and potential
costs arising from limitations on competition. The measures discussed
above, including limited scope and duration, broad participation that
includes public and private actors, and the public release and sharing
of data and intellectual property, may serve to limit the potential
negative effects on innovation. Requiring collaborations to be specific
about the economic and scientific benefits of the collaborative
activities that they propose may impose needed discipline on those
seeking to form collaborations, as well as provide antitrust authorities

286. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Bioinformatics, in
BIOINFORMATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE POSTGENOME ERA 113, 123 (Jorge L. Contreras & A. James Cuticchia eds., 2013).
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with useful data as they evaluate the collaboration. Requiring
collaborations to limit activities to those areas where the desired
results are unlikely to be reached through individual efforts and/or
will not be reached within a reasonable time or at a reasonable cost
will further increase the likelihood that the collaborations will be
viewed as procompetitive.
CONCLUSION
Both federal agencies and industry participants have turned to
new forms of collaboration to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of biomedical research. Industry participants, many of them
competitors, come together to define joint R&D objectives and share
project results in what are widely known as pre-competitive
collaborations. Their actions suggest a prevailing belief that these precompetitive endeavors are not only permissible but encouraged. In
contrast, neither the courts nor the federal agencies charged with
enforcing U.S. antitrust laws have recognized pre-competitive activity
as immune from antitrust challenge. Rather, the DOJ and FTC, in the
guidance that they have provided regarding collaborations among
competitors, have repeatedly emphasized that anticompetitive
behavior may arise at many stages, from early R&D to final product
marketing and sales. Thus, while many pre-competitive collaborations
may offer significant procompetitive benefits and thereby avoid
antitrust concern, it is not the case that every collaboration conducted
prior to product release or as part of a common technology platform
will be immune from antitrust liability. Accordingly, the prevailing
intuition within the biopharma and other industries that precompetitive collaborations enjoy some form of antitrust safe harbor is
misguided. Far from being benign, this misconception has the
potential both to encourage early-stage collaborations that may in
fact be anticompetitive and discourage later-stage, yet manifestly
procompetitive, collaborations.
This Article shows that pre-competitive collaborations may not
always result in significant procompetitive benefits and, conversely,
that collaborations conducted at later stages of the product
development life cycle, though not pre-competitive, may actually
yield substantial procompetitive benefits. Thus, in the critical search
for more effective and rapid forms of collaboration in the biopharma
and other industries, we urge policymakers and industry leaders to
shed any undue reliance on the notion of pre-competition as a salve
for antitrust concern and instead to analyze potential collaborations
using the rule of reason framework long recognized by antitrust law
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and policy. The infusion of traditional antitrust analysis into current
debates regarding the desirability of various forms of industry
collaboration will improve resulting collaborative structures and
enhance the potential for innovation in evolving product and
technology markets.
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